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Good stewardship of the planet’s natural resources is the central challenge of 
our age, and energy generation and usage has become an important dimension of the 
current debate about sustainability. Americans spend approximately 5% of household 
income on energy, and over the last few decades—and as recently as with President 
Obama’s stimulus package of 2009--many government policies have been targeted at 
residential energy efficiency. Improving energy efficiency would reduce total energy 
usage, emissions associated with generation of power from fossil fuels, and reliance 
on imports of such fuels. In this dissertation, I analyze three key aspects of residential 
energy behavior and their impact on policy. 
The first is elasticity of energy demand with respect to price. Earlier estimates 
span a wide range, due to the differing geographic coverage and time scales used in 
each study. In Chapter 3, I estimate a residential demand function for energy on a 
recent, nationwide panel of U.S. homes, and find higher price elasticities than 
previously documented. These results suggest that residential consumers are price 
  
responsive in their energy consumption. How they respond to price is the topic of 
Chapter 4, where I estimate a series of demand functions for energy efficiency 
improvements, and focus on the role of moving on energy investment. I find that 
households that move within 2 years are 20% less likely to invest in heaters than 
those who do not move, suggesting that homeowners do not believe that energy 
efficiency is capitalized into the value of the home. Requiring disclosure about the 
energy efficiency of a home during the sales process may remedy this disincentive.  
In Chapter 5, I use data from an original survey of households to examine how 
consumers value future savings from energy bills vis-à-vis money. I find that 
consumers apply a lower discount rate to energy savings than to money, suggesting 
that market failures, rather than consumer bias, may be responsible for a low rate of 
residential energy efficiency investment. 
Taken together, these findings contribute a greater understanding of 
residential energy behavior, and underscore the potential for intelligent policy to 
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Energy makes the world go round. The discoverers and exploiters of energy 
sources wrote the history of the modern world. Many of the actions and activities that 
humankind takes for granted, from the cars and trains that we travel in, to the warm 
rooms that we sleep in, to the computers that we type on; are directly manufactured, 
delivered, or enabled by the consumption of energy. In the United States and many 
parts of the world, energy is predominantly generated by fossil fuel combustion. 
Despite the specter raised by “peak oil” advocates, resource exhaustion is less of a 
threat to society than other impacts of the growth in consumption of fossil fuels: 
direct byproducts of combustion, such as carbon dioxide, alter and pollute the 
atmosphere, unleashing dramatic changes to the climate. Large-scale extraction 
inevitably results in leaks, spills, and the destruction of the local landscape. Implicit 
and explicit security guarantees necessary to insure continued delivery of imported 
fuel are costly and morally fraught. However, few alternatives seem to exist.  
 Those agitating for a transition away from fossil fuels seem all too often to 
ignore the economics. Hucksters hoping to profit from new subsidies make overly 
optimistic claims about their brand of renewable energy. Diehard vested interests go 
to great lengths to downplay and obfuscate the risks of continuing the status quo. 
With such large stakes and partisan players, objectivity and considered planning are a 
challenge. Yet, one solution does emerge, time and again, from reports and white 
papers by those great and good: energy efficiency. It is cost-effective, simple, can be 
done with existing technology, is domestically produced and locally sourced; in other 




consumption can potentially mitigate, reduce, and reverse many of the environmental 
and security issues described above. How do we realize this potential? How do we 
embark on this energy diet? 
 This dissertation contributes in a small way to this literature by exploring the 
‘who, what, and how’ of residential energy efficiency. The conclusions are a reason 
for hope, but also an acknowledgement of the barriers and difficulty faced on the road 
ahead. Bring on the $20 bills! 
 
“For the next few decades, energy efficiency is one of the lowest cost options for reducing US 
carbon emissions. …Some economists, however, don't believe these analyses; they say there 
aren't 20-dollar bills lying around waiting to be picked up. If the savings were real, they 
argue, why didn't the free market vacuum them up? The skeptics are asking a fair question: 
why do potential energy efficiency savings often go unrealized? … Regardless of what the 
skeptics may think, there are indeed 20-dollar bills lying on the ground all around us. We 
only need the will -- and the ways -- to pick them up.” 
 
Excerpt from an Op-Ed entitled “Energy Efficiency: Achieving the Potential, Realizing the 



















 To Rebecca, for your patience and support. 





Student debt comes in many forms. From my six years at Maryland, I have 
accumulated a massive debt of gratitude to the many instructors, advisors, and 
colleagues who gave willingly of their time to further my education. With the 
understanding that this small bit of thanks is insufficient repayment of such a debt, I 
hereby seek to acknowledge a few of those individuals that stood out, and without 
whom this work would not have been impossible.  
I wish to thank my primary advisor, Professor Anna Alberini, for her profound 
effort and encouragement. She was in many respects a model advisor: encouraging 
me to present and submit my work, suggesting new topics and essays to pursue, 
providing a critical eye when needed, and always extremely generous with her time. I 
am grateful for her influence and instruction. 
I gratefully acknowledge Professor Charles Towe for his valuable inputs on 
my research, his willingness to share his experience in data gathering, and his support 
in designing and implementing the energy survey. I thank Professor Ted McConnell 
for his mentorship and encouragement throughout the graduate process, and his 
willingness to listen and ask tough questions through several years and several topic 
changes. I thank Professor Rob Williams for his strong support of my research, and 
for his critical eye and difficult questions. My work is better for it.  
My research would not have been possible without data, and I gratefully 
acknowledge funding for the design and collection of the Maryland Energy Survey 




My time at AREC was a whirlwind of learning and challenging courses, and I 
am grateful to the faculty for providing an environment so conducive to learning. I 
am especially thankful to have had the econometrics training provided by Professors 
Richard Just, Nerlove, and Alberini; the theoretical training of Professors Lars Olson 
and Bob Chambers, and the grounding in environmental economics provided by 
Professor Maureen Cropper and Erik Lichtenberg.  
I am grateful to Professors Lichtenberg, Andreas Lange, and John Horowitz 
for mentoring and early support and discussions about my research. I likewise 
acknowledge the wisdom and support of current and former AREC colleagues 
Upamanyu Datta, Geret Depiper, Olivier Francois, Dennis Guignet, Nate Higgins, 
Beat Hintermann, Jorge Holzer, Adan Martinez-Cruz, Andy Stocking, and Fanqing 









Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ vii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Chapter 2: Review of the Literature .............................................................................. 7 
dA. The Role of Price ............................................................................................... 8 
B. Price Elasticity of Demand ................................................................................. 12 
C. Energy Efficiency Paradox ................................................................................. 16 
D. Conservation and Energy Efficiency Investment............................................... 19 
Chapter 3: Residential Energy Demand Estimation Using American Housing Survey 
..................................................................................................................................... 24 
A. American Housing Survey Data ........................................................................ 25 
A.1 Energy Consumption and Utilities’ Rates .................................................... 30 
A.2 Other Determinants of Energy Use .............................................................. 33 
B. Estimation Strategy ............................................................................................ 37 
C. Estimation of the Dynamic Model ..................................................................... 40 
D. Mismeasured Prices ........................................................................................... 41 
E. Results ................................................................................................................ 44 
F. Robustness checks .............................................................................................. 49 
G. Dynamic Models and Models with Investments ................................................ 52 
H. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 54 
Chapter 4: The Role of Planned Tenure in Energy Efficiency Investments ............... 56 
A. American Housing Survey Data ........................................................................ 57 
A.1 Investment Variables .................................................................................... 59 
A.2 Household Characteristics ........................................................................... 61 
B. Model and Estimation ........................................................................................ 62 
B.1 Model Selection ............................................................................................ 64 
B.2 Econometric Issues ....................................................................................... 65 
B.3 Estimation Methodology ............................................................................... 67 
B.4 Statistical Tests and Robustness Checks ...................................................... 68 
C. Results ................................................................................................................ 69 
C.1 Reduced Form .............................................................................................. 69 
C.2 The Tenure Decision .................................................................................... 72 
C.3 Other Investment Types ................................................................................ 75 
C.4 Robustness Checks ....................................................................................... 79 
D. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 80 
Chapter 5: Discount Rates and Investment ................................................................. 83 




A.1 Survey Design ............................................................................................... 85 
A.2 Structure of the Questionnaire ..................................................................... 89 
A.3 Choice Experiment 1 (Energy) ..................................................................... 90 
A.4 Choice Experiment 2 (money-versus-money) ............................................... 94 
A.5 Characteristics of the Sample ....................................................................... 96 
B. Model and Estimation ...................................................................................... 100 
B.1 Discounting Future Energy Savings ........................................................... 100 
B.2 Discounting Future Income ........................................................................ 102 
C. Results .............................................................................................................. 103 
C.1 Comparison of Discount Rates ................................................................... 103 
C.2 Interaction of Discount Rate with Sample Characteristics – Energy Savings
........................................................................................................................... 105 
C.3 Interaction of Discount Rate with Sample Characteristics – Money ......... 110 
D. Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 113 
Chapter 6: Conclusions ............................................................................................. 115 
Appendices ................................................................................................................ 118 
Appendix A: Notes for American Housing Survey Data .......................................... 118 
Appendix B: Additional Robustness Regressions from Chapter 4 ........................... 123 
Appendix C: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5 .............................................. 125 
C.1 Notes for Maryland Survey Data ................................................................... 125 
C.2 Text of Survey Mailings ................................................................................. 126 
C.3 Information on Support Website .................................................................... 130 
C.4 Additional Figures from Questionnaire .......................................................... 132 







List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Selected empirical studies and price elasticity estimates .................................. 14 
Table 3.1 Included metropolitan areas selected for the study ........................................... 27 
Table 3.2 Distribution of the sample by city (N=98,772) ................................................. 29 
Table 3.3 Distribution by length of the longitudinal component (N=98,772) .................. 30 
Table 3.4 Prices and monthly consumption of electricity and natural gas ....................... 33 
Table 3.5 House characteristics ........................................................................................ 35 
Table 3.6 Heating and cooling equipment and appliances ............................................... 36 
Table 3.7 Household characteristics ................................................................................. 37 
Table 3.8 Static model (Dependent: log of electricity usage) ........................................... 45 
Table 3.9 Static model (Dependent: log of gas usage) ..................................................... 46 
Table 3.10 Blundell-Bond estimates of dynamic models ................................................. 53 
Table 4.1 Sample observations by survey year ................................................................. 59 
Table 4.2 Sample observations by longitudinal component ............................................. 59 
Table 4.3 Classification of investment types .................................................................... 60 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of the sample ................................................................... 62 
Table 4.5 Reduced form results ........................................................................................ 70 
Table 4.6 2SLS heater investments ................................................................................... 73 
Table 4.7 Bivariate probit heater investments .................................................................. 74 
Table 4.8 Energy and non-energy investments ................................................................. 76 
Table 4.9 Model comparison ............................................................................................ 79 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of respondents and targets by group .............................................. 86 
Table 5.2: Sequence of Mailings and Enticements for Survey ......................................... 88 
Table 5.3 Choice pairs offered in Experiment 1 ............................................................... 93 
Table 5.4 Choice pairs offered in Experiment 2, with indifference discount rate ............ 94 
Table 5.5 Respondent Comparison to State of MD Population (US Census) .................. 96 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics for survey sample ............................................................ 97 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics for rating variables ........................................................ 100 
Table 5.8 Discount rate estimates ................................................................................... 104 
Table 5.9 Discount (Energy) Interactions with Household Characteristics .................... 106 
Table 5.10 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with choice characteristics ....................... 107 
Table 5.11 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with bills and price expectations .............. 108 
Table 5.12 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with energy investment attitudes ............. 110 
Table 5.13 Discount (Money) - Interactions with household characteristics ................. 111 
Table 5.14 Discount (Money) - Interactions with choice characteristics ....................... 112 
Table AB.1 Any heater investments on different samples ............................................. 123 
Table AB.2 Additional investment classes ..................................................................... 124 




List of Figures 
Figure 1: Map of Distribution of AHS Sample ................................................................. 34 
Figure 2: Screen 1 of choice Experiment 1 ................................................................... 90 
Figure 3: Screen Shot of Support Home Page ................................................................ 130 
Figure 4: Screen Shot of Privacy Page ........................................................................... 131 
Figure 5: Screen Shot of Research Goals ....................................................................... 131 
Figure 6: Attribute Ratings after Choice Experiment 1 .................................................. 132 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1954, Lewis Strauss, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, boasted that 
nuclear power would usher in an era when people “will enjoy in their homes electrical 
energy too cheap to meter.” This bit of hyperbole neatly captures the attitude of many 
Americans towards energy consumption today: not costly enough to worry about. Yet 
concerns are mounting about the reliance on fossil fuel and the attendant environmental 
and economic costs. Fossil fuel combustion, the primary means of electricity generation 
and heating, produces undesirable emissions that threaten human and environmental 
health.  
In the US, energy usage in buildings accounts for a sizable fraction (30-40%) of 
total energy use and energy-related emissions (EIA, 2008). Buildings thus offer a natural 
target for policies that seek to reduce energy consumption and increase energy efficiency. 
Effective residential energy efficiency policies would help reduce CO2 and conventional 
pollutant emissions from (fossil-fuel) power generation, reduce dependence on imported 
fuels and vulnerability to supply shocks, and likely, create jobs (Wei et al., 2010).  
Building energy consumers can be broadly classified into two sectors: residential 
and non-residential. The latter group is comprised of institutional concerns, such as 
schools and government installations, commercial properties such as office buildings, 
stores and shopping malls, and industrial or manufacturing facilities. These non-
residential demanders share a financial incentive for greater energy efficiency: energy is a 
costly production input, and profit can be increased (or costs reduced) by minimizing 




companies and facilities employ professional energy managers to accomplish cost-
effective energy efficiency.  
By contrast, residential consumers tend to lack the resources and diligence (not to 
mention financial motivation) to expend comparable effort on energy optimization. For 
this reason – and because of its size – the residential sector offers a major opportunity to 
reduce energy usage, and, accordingly, has received considerable policy attention. The 
2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example, states that 
significant carbon dioxide emission reductions are possible at low or no cost through 
energy efficiency improvements in buildings, including residential buildings (Levine et 
al., 2007), but there remains significant skepticism as to whether consumers actually do 
spontaneously undertake energy efficiency investments and renovations at their home 
(Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Golove and Eto, 1996).  
Many government policies have been specifically targeted at buildings and 
residential energy usage over the last few decades. These include, among others, 1) 
aggressive pricing policies, 2) incentives for conservation and energy efficiency 
investments, and 3) regulations, including energy efficiency standards that must be met 
by appliances, new buildings, and building retrofits. Most recently, the 2009 American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (‘The Stimulus Bill’) allocated over $300 million to 
efficiency incentives in the home, and additional measures have been adopted by 
municipalities and states, and by utility companies at the behest of Public Utility 
Commissions. While these policies vary in terms of products (e.g., lights, washing 




rebates), their common goal is to enhance the energy efficiency of the building sector.1 
Despite the strength of policy support, however, evidence about the effectiveness of these 
measures is limited. 
Some observers argue that if consumers knew what drives their energy 
consumption and were informed about opportunities for conservation and energy 
efficiency investments, they may undertake them spontaneously. Low-cost or free audits 
and informational campaigns are examples of policies based on these arguments. Energy 
Service Companies (ESCOs) are an example of a marketplace solution to the investment 
gap surrounding energy usage and energy efficiency.2  
Residential consumers can reduce their consumption by engaging in conservation 
measures (such as moderating their heating or cooling demand) or by investing in more 
efficient equipment. Energy is a derived demand: consumers demand services (lighting, 
heating, washing) that are converted to a demand for energy through appliances and 
equipment. This has important consequences for residential energy usage behavior. 
Compared with rates of return from other assets, on average, residential energy 
consumers underinvest in energy efficiency. Many observers attribute this phenomenon 
to energy users having higher discount rates for energy savings than for non-energy 
investments, which results in lower rates of investment for energy efficiency projects. 
This energy-efficiency ‘paradox’ or ‘gap,’ (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994) has generated a lot of 
research and policy interest. Possible explanations include uncertainty (over future 
                                                 
1 Regulatory approaches, such as building codes and appliances standards, have also been used to promote energy 
efficiency (see, e.g. CA CCR Title 24 at http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/). 
 
2 An ESCO will undertake an investment on behalf of a facility, and perhaps even operate the new equipment. The 
ESCO then ‘sells’ the service back to the facility, and profits from the difference between the ‘sale’ price and the new, 





energy prices), irreversibility (of the durable good), and information asymmetry (over the 
performance of the appliance), and/or institutional disincentives (owners versus renters). 
Clearly, it is important to understand the determinants of energy consumption in 
buildings and among residential customers, and the responsiveness of consumers to 
pricing and other policies. The focus of this dissertation is on understanding the U.S. 
residential energy consumers, their usage of energy, and their decisions about energy 
efficiency home renovations and investments. I analyze three main facets of residential 
energy consumption and investment behavior.  
First, in Chapter 3, I focus on estimating a residential demand function for 
electricity and natural gas. In that chapter, I ask two broad research questions: 1) what are 
the determinants of residential energy consumption, and 2) how do consumers respond to 
price? I use recent longitudinal household data drawn from the American Housing 
Survey, which reports information about the structural characteristics of a very large 
sample of homes in the US, along with utilities and energy expenditures, appliances, 
heating and cooling systems, and characteristics of the households residing in those 
homes. I develop a large, nationwide sample that follows homes from 1997 to 2007. I 
merge these data with weather data, since weather is an important determinant of energy 
demand, and with information about energy prices and the utilities serving each area 
covered by the sample.  
I find that electricity and gas usage is well predicted by house characteristics, the 
type of heating and cooling system, tenure and ownership, weather and household 
characteristics. Importantly, my models allow me to identify both short-term and long-




appreciated. I estimate own-price elasticities of electricity and gas demand of 
approximately -0.7 and -0.6, respectively. Residential consumers are price responsive, 
and the long-term price elasticity is sufficiently strong to suggest that households do 
engage in renovations and replacement of appliances that improve energy efficiency, at 
least at locales or during periods when the prices are high. 
These findings motivate the investigation in Chapter 4, where I specifically focus 
on residential investment in energy efficiency renovations and improvements. I ask two 
key research questions: 1) what are the determinants of energy efficiency investments in 
the home, and 2) how are energy efficiency investments affected by moving/staying 
decisions?  
I examine the home renovations and improvements documented in the American 
Housing Survey from 1997 to 2009 (up to 9 waves). Briefly, I find that households that 
move within 2 years are 20% less likely to invest in heater renovations or replacements, 
but that there is no statistically significant relationship between moving or staying and 
other classes of investment, such as kitchen renovations or yard repairs. This result 
suggests that homeowners do not believe that energy efficiency is capitalized into the 
value of the home, and therefore forego efficiency upgrades prior to moving. This has 
very important policy implications: Requiring disclosure about the energy efficiency of a 
home when selling it/buying may be the remedy to this disincentive. Indeed, recent 
evidence (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Eichholtz et al., 2010) suggests that signals about the 
energy efficiency of a building tend to raise it selling price. 
Neither the American Housing Survey, which I used in my empirical analyses of 




Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey), however, elicit any 
information about consumer response to energy-efficiency incentives or explicit tradeoffs 
between appliance prices and energy savings when purchasing appliances. To study these 
issues, which are extremely important in energy economics and policy, I developed my 
own survey questionnaire, which I administered to a sample of Maryland households.  
In Chapter 5, I use data from this original survey of households to examine how 
consumers value future savings from energy bills vis-à-vis money. I ask whether their 
rate of time preference in the energy savings context differs from that exhibited in the 
‘money now versus money later’ context. Briefly, I find that the discount rate for energy 
savings is significantly lower than the discount rate for money. This result stands in 
contrast to the literature on the energy efficiency paradox, and suggests that low diffusion 
of energy efficiency appliances may be attributable to market failures rather than 
consumer preferences or bias. 
By combining novel, comprehensive, and contemporary data, and extensive 
empirical testing and checks for robustness, my work is a contribution to understanding 
residential energy consumption and investment behavior, and to designing and 
developing policies that seek to influence this behavior to advance energy efficiency and 










Chapter 2: Review of the Literature 
Many factors contribute to residential demand for energy. Structural 
characteristics of the home, appliances, and external climate factors interact with 
household preferences and habits to determine the total demand for energy. In the 
economics literature, however, the demand driver that has received the most devoted 
attention is the price of energy. 
 As an economic good, energy is priced at equilibrium between the supply curve 
of electricity generators or fuel suppliers, and the demand curve for home energy users. 
The simplicity of this relationship is distorted by the nature of the predominant residential 
energy fuel – electricity – and the institutions of the energy supply sector. Electricity is 
difficult to store, so electricity supply must vary to meet a fluctuating demand. The 
combination of work and school schedules and changes in weather leads to a highly 
variable demand for electricity from an individual home over the course of a single day. 
When aggregated up to the level of a city, the difference between ‘peak’ and ‘off-peak’ 
demand can be as much as 300% or more. 
This fluctuation has several consequences. For one, it complicates pricing. In a 
residential setting, it is impractical that the price of electricity be allowed to vary wildly 
with surges in demand, so many electric utilities bi-modally segment demand into peak 
and off-peak regimes for the purposes of customer pricing. As an operational 
consequence, spare supply capacity must be available to balance the system load. Some 
of this spare capacity remains unutilized, acting as costly insurance to consumers. In 
addition, the electric power utility companies, and, to a lesser extent, the fuel delivery 




structure of the tariff (energy purchase contract between the utility and residential 
customer) is complex and tightly delimited.  
For these reasons, although energy is a commonly traded commodity, institutional 
barriers, customer ignorance, and perverse incentives lead to a host of economic 
inefficiencies and market failures. This makes a study on price both an interesting 
research endeavor and a worthwhile policy contribution. 
A. The Role of Price 
There is a debate in the literature about the most relevant price for energy 
consumers. Standard economic theory posits that what matters in the household’s energy 
demand is marginal price. If price is constant with respect to quantity and there is no 
fixed fee, the marginal price is constant and equal to the average price. In practice, this is 
seldom the case. For starters, many utilities charge a fixed fee in each billing period on 
top of the metered amount, which makes the marginal and average price per unit of 
energy different. Moreover, most utilities apply block pricing schemes, which result in 
marginal prices that depend on the quantity consumed, but do not vary smoothly with it. 
The budget constraint will be piecewise linear, and for most households the marginal and 
the average price will be different. Even more important, marginal block price and 
consumption are simultaneously determined (Burtless and Hausman, 1978).  
In the presence of block pricing, which should be entered in the econometric 
model of consumption—marginal or average price? Howe and Linaweaver (1967) argue 
that the relevant variable is marginal block price. Taylor (1975) and Nordin (1976) 




transfers implied by block rates, and propose ways to test the marginal price versus 
average price model.  
Later studies used instrumental variable estimation techniques to address the 
simultaneity of marginal price, quantity consumed, and “difference”. Wilder and 
Willenberg (1975) instrument for observed marginal block price and the “difference” 
variable using exogenous variables such as housing and household characteristics, and 
the block prices themselves. McFadden et al. (1977) present an alternative IV approach, 
whereby observed usage is regressed on dwelling and household characteristics and the 
typical bills that would be incurred at specified levels of consumption. The predicted 
quantities and the rate schedule are used to form the predicted price variable, which 
serves as an instrumental variable for marginal prices in the second stage of estimation.  
Terza (1986) points out that this approach may introduce spurious correlation 
between observed marginal price and the econometric error term, making the correlation 
problem appear to be more severe that it truly is. Moreover, McFadden et al. did not have 
the actual rate schedules. Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) implement an approach 
similar to McFadden et al. (1977), but in the first stage they regress actual usage on the 
actual marginal prices that a household would face at different levels of demand (and 
other exogenous variables).  
Hewitt and Hanemann (1995) use maximum likelihood estimation in the presence 
of block pricing. Reiss and White (2005) focus on the California households in the 
Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS), match each household with the block 
pricing structure applied by the utility that serves the area, and estimate a model of choice 




matters is marginal price, yet there is evidence that marginal price is not salient to 
consumers. In two working papers, Borenstein (2008, 2009) finds that customers do not 
respond to marginal price. In Borenstein (2009), household level data from California 
were used to model customer response to marginal price, expected marginal price, and 
average price. To optimally consume under increasing block pricing, the consumer must 
know the timing of exogenous demand shocks (e.g., extremely hot days) at the beginning 
of the billing period. These informational requirements motivate Borenstein’s 
formulation of expected marginal price.  
Shin (1985) argues that households respond to average price, which is easily 
calculated from electricity bill, rather than actual block marginal price, because it costly 
to determine the latter. Borenstein (2009) echoes that result: he finds that many of the 
consumers respond to an average price, rather than a marginal or expected marginal 
price, suggesting that informational or educational campaigns could improve 
understanding of non-linear pricing schedules. An additional concern is whether usage 
decisions depend on the price in the current (billing) period, on that of earlier periods, or 
a moving average of the prices of recent periods (Poyer and Williams, 1993).  
Non-linear tariffs usually exist as a mechanism to discourage overconsumption of 
a good when technology or regulatory authority is lacking to impose more direct scarcity 
rents. Yet there is often a cognitive cost to the consumer associated with observing and 
responding to non-linear tariffs that limits their effectiveness. There may be other reasons 
for consumers to prefer flat tariffs. Herweg and Mierendorff (2011) develop a model 
which indicates that loss-aversion in a setting with uncertainty of demand may result in 




tariff because of the implicit insurance provided (in the event that they exceed their 
demand estimate), even if they could minimize costs by choosing a metered tariff. In such 
a setting, it may be optimal for firms to offer a flat rate schedule, even though the 
existence of such a tariff is economically inefficient in light of non-zero marginal 
provision costs and low transaction/monitoring costs. This effect has been documented 
before for tariffs in telecommunications (e.g., Lambrecht and Skiera 2006), but the logic 
applies to energy usage. A high cognitive cost of energy monitoring may actually lead 
consumers towards a more inefficient tariff.  
Ito (2010) summarizes alternative models of consumer behavior in the presence of 
block pricing, showing that people will invest effort in finding out the price of energy 
only to the point in which the gains from re-optimizing consumption decisions exceed the 
cost of the effort spent monitoring and investigating prices. He reasons that the monthly 
billing structure of most utility bills, combined with the presence of non-linear pricing 
schemes, means that consumers must have knowledge of their cumulative (since the 
beginning of the billing period) consumption as well as their actual price schedule in 
order to determine (i) which section of the price schedule they face, and (ii) the 
magnitude of the prices. Only then might they estimate their true marginal cost of 
consumption. Without specialized devices or costly effort, it is unlikely that consumers 
are capable of calculating marginal price. Ito calculates a maximum potential savings of 
$2 monthly from optimizing consumption to marginal, instead of average price: Such 
small savings wouldn’t make the cost of monitoring worthwhile. 
Relatedly, there is an emerging literature about the cognitive cost of monitoring 




(2009) find that consumers do not always account for tax in their consumption, and that 
demand reduces significantly when they do. Given the complexity of most energy bills, 
and the inherent fluctuations in usage, it might be expected that a similar effect exists in 
energy consumption. Recently, Shultz et al. (2007) find that the simple reporting of 
average monthly energy consumption relative to the neighborhood (i.e. ‘more’ or ‘less’) 
can affect energy consumption. 
Bushnell and Mansur (2005) study residential energy consumption behavior 
during the California energy crisis of 1999 and 2000, a period of extreme price volatility 
in the San Diego market, and find strong evidence that consumers respond to lagged, 
rather than contemporaneous, electricity price. Their study uses aggregate market-level 
data in which all customers experienced dramatic exogenous rate changes. Using a 
difference-in-difference estimation technique, they find more explanatory power in a 
model using a five-week price lag than with one using a contemporaneous price 
specification. This suggests that, for the majority of consumers, the cognitive cost of real-
time price monitoring was sufficiently high, or the returns sufficiently low, that they 
simply did not monitor.  
B. Price Elasticity of Demand 
Knowing the responsiveness of energy demand to the price allows analysts to 
predict the effects of price changes or policies that result in price changes—for example, 
general energy taxes, taxes on carbon emissions, or mandates on the share of renewable 
energy. Earlier research has produced a wide range of estimates of the price elasticity of 
demand in the residential sector, possibly because of the diverse types of data used (time- 




(local, state, or national), extent of the observed variation in price, and time periods 
covered.  
Selected studies that estimate price elasticity are summarized in table 2.1. These 
include studies based on annual time-series aggregates for the entire US, such as 
Dergiades and Tsoulfidis (2008), who estimate the short- (long-) run own-price elasticity 
of residential electricity consumption to be -0.386 (-1.06), and Kamerschen and Porter 
(2004), where the elasticities range from -0.94 to -0.85. Studies based on recent state-
level panel data, such as Bernstein and Griffin (2005), Paul et al. (2008), and Alberini 
and Filippini (2010), have often found that the demand is relatively insensitive to price, at 
least in the short term, and that the estimates of the long-run elasticity are very sensitive 
to the specific estimation procedure.3 Garcia-Cerrutti (2000) uses county-level data from 
44 California counties for 1983-1997, estimates the own-price elasticity of electricity 
demand to be -0.17 in the short run and -0.19 in the long run, and uncovers significant 
variation between counties. 
 
  
                                                 
3 For example, Alberini and Filippini (2010) use annual state-level data in the U.S. from 1995 to 2007, and attempt to 
get consistent estimates of the long-run elasticity by using a bias correct “within” estimator (Kiviet, 1995) and the 
Blundell-Bond (1998) approach. The short-run own price elasticities of electricity range from -0.15 to -0.08, and their 




Table 2.1 Selected empirical studies and price elasticity estimates 
Study Type of Data Coverage Estimate, Fuel Demand 
Dergiades and Tsoulfidis 
(2008) 
Nationwide total, time series, 
1965-2006 
-0.386 short-run (-1.06 long-run) 
electricity 
Kamerschen and Porter 
(2004) 
Nationwide total, time series, 
1973-1998 
Long-run: -0.94 to -0.85 electricity 
Alberini and Filippini 
(2010) 
State-level, panel data, 1995-2007 -0.15 to -0.08 (-0.78 to -0.44) elect. 
Bernstein and Griffin 
(2005) 
State-level, panel data, 1997-2004 -0.243 (-0.32) electricity 
Paul et al. (2008) State-level, panel data, 1990-2006 -0.13 (-0.36) electricity 
Maddala et al. (1997) State-level, panel data, 1970-1990 
-0.19 to -0.21 (-0.56 to -1.03) elect; 
-0.09 to -0.18 (0.24 to -1.36) gas 
Garcia-Cerrutti (2000) 
California county-level, panel data, 
1983-1997 
Long-run: -0.17 electricity; 
-0.11 gas 
Quigley and Rubinfeld 
(1989) 
AHS household-level, cross 
section, 1980 
-0.1 energy 
Fell, Li, and Paul (2010) CEX and RECS household-level, 
2004-2006 
-0.82 to -1.02 electricity 
Metcalf and Hassett (1999) 
RECS household-level, panel data, 
1984, 1987 and 1990 
-0.78 to -1.11 electricity; 
-0.48 to -0.71 gas 
Reiss and White (2005) 
California RECS, household-level, 
multi-year cross sections, 1993 and 
1997 
-0.85 to -1.02 electricity 
Studies Outside the U.S. 
Meier and Rehdanz (2010) 
UK, household-level, panel data, 
1991-2005 
-0.4 to -0.49 oil 
-0.34 to -0.56 gas 
Rehdanz (2007) 
Germany household-level panel, 
1998 and 2003 
-2.03 to -1.68 oil; 
-0.63 to -0.44 gas 
Leth-Petersen and Togeby 
(2001) 
Denmark panel data, 1984-1995 -0.08 oil; 
-0.02 district heating 
Bernard et al. (2010) 
Quebec household-level, multi-year 
cross-sections, 1989-2002 
-0.51 (-1.32) electricity 
Nesbakken (1999) 
Norway household level, multi-year 
cross-sections, 1990-1992, 1994-
1995 
-0.33 (-0.66) electricity 
 
 
Most household-level data studies are limited in either time coverage or 
geographic scale. Quigley and Rubinfeld (1989) use a cross-section from the 1980 
American Housing Survey and find evidence of low elasticity of energy demand (-0.1 in 




Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) to examine 
homeowners’ insulation investments, finding price elasticities of electricity ranging from 
-0.73 to -1.16.  
 Bernard et al. (2010) have multi-year cross-sections about electricity and gas 
consumption and prices in Quebec from 1989-2002, estimate the short-run and long-run 
elasticity to be -0.51 and -1.32, respectively, and conclude that electricity and natural gas 
are substitutes. Studies outside of North America tend to produce price elasticity ranges 
similar to those for North America. Nesbakken (1999) focuses on the choice of heating 
and residential energy consumption in Norway, reporting that short- and long-term price 
elasticities (in the range of -0.33 to -0.66) are remarkably stable across the 1990-1995 
period, with the only exception of 1993. In contrast to other papers, responsiveness to 
price is more pronounced at higher levels of income. Rehdanz (2007) examines 
expenditures for residential space heating in Germany, and Meier and Rehdanz (2010) 
use a 15-year panel of residential heating expenditures in Great Britain. Using a log-
linear specification with year and regional effects, they obtain gas price elasticities 
between -0.4 and -0.49, which fall in the range of -0.2 to -0.57 from the comparable 
literature. They obtain different elasticities for homeowners and renters. Leth-Petersen 
and Togeby (2001) find much lower price elasticities in heating fuels (on the order of -
0.1) based on a panel dataset from Denmark and a conditional logit fixed-effect model. 
Reiss and White (2005) focus on the California households in RECS, match each 
household with the block pricing structure applied by the utility that serves each area, 
and estimate a model of choice of block and consumption levels using Generalized 




 One concern when examining the responsiveness of electricity use with respect to 
price is that the data contain sufficient price variation. Such variation is usually attained 
by selecting a broad geographic area and/or a sufficient long period of time. In some 
cases, identification is made possible by abrupt changes in prices due to supply 
conditions. Reiss and White (2008) and Bushnell and Mansur (2005) exploit the energy 
crisis and rapidly growing electricity rates in California in 2000 and 2001, and document 
relatively large reductions in energy usage induced by such price increases. Haas and 
Schipper (1998) argue that energy-saving investments spurred by raising prices are likely 
to remain in place even in periods of declining energy prices, but in practice there is 
reason to question the external validity of findings based on unusual market 
circumstances at specific locations. In Chapter 3, I estimate the price elasticity of 
demand for electricity and natural gas using nationwide household-level panel data. This 
provides sufficient geographic and time variation to identify the demand parameters 
while ensuring a result generalizable to the entire U.S.  
C. Energy Efficiency Paradox 
 Despite repeated assertions of the enormous potential for efficiency-enabled 
energy savings in the residential sector (National Academy of sciences, 2010, EPRI 2009, 
Granade et al., 2009) the rate of adoption and diffusion of apparently cost-effective 
technology is lower than can be explained by price alone. This so-called “energy 
efficiency paradox” (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995), has been interpreted to imply high discount 
rates for energy efficiency, and has been explained as the result of high switching costs 




Hassett and Metcalf, 1993), or simply liquidity constraints (Hausman, 1979). Golove and 
Eto (1996) provide a useful synopsis of this literature. 
Recent research has highlighted some alternative reasons for lack of investment in 
energy efficiency. Nair et al. (2010) use a 2008 survey of Swedish homeowners and find 
that a host of personal and ‘contextual’ factors may affect adoption of energy efficient 
technology, such as awareness about energy efficiency measures or perception of cost. Ek 
and Söderholm (2010) use a separate survey of Swedish households to assess the stated 
willingness of consumers to take general conservation steps, which may include adopting 
new technology. They find an increasing willingness with age, which they attribute to a 
greater stock of conservation knowledge from past awareness campaigns.  
Metcalf and Hassett (1999) suggest that people do not invest more readily in 
energy efficient technology because they do not believe the energy savings predicted by 
engineering estimates. They estimate a model that shows that people make investments in 
energy efficiency in homes at an internal rate of return comparable to market interest 
rates. This result suggests a greater role for government education and awareness 
campaigns may be effective.  
Some people may not invest or take conservation steps because they simply do 
not like to change. Hartman, Doane, and Woo (1991) use a survey of electric customers 
in California to investigate the value of electricity reliability – not consumption itself, but 
something that would affect the utility of consumption. They find strong evidence of a 
status quo bias using a contingent valuation survey of electric consumers. In some 
instances, they find the effect to be so strong that consumers must actually be 




  Others have suggested that ignorance explains the energy efficiency paradox, and 
that educational awareness campaigns can alleviate it. The empirical evidence for this 
“uninformed consumer hypothesis” is mixed. Brill et al. (1999) find that factors such as 
home age and size, weather, air conditioning, and fuel price are important in explaining 
insulation investment. Education level (a proxy for awareness about energy efficiency), 
however, has either no impact or a negative impact. Similarly, Jakob (2007b) finds no 
evidence of systemic ignorance, but instead identifies building extension or repair 
considerations, rather than efficiency, as the dominant consideration when making 
renovation decisions. In contrast, using a survey on 517 Swiss renters and homeowners, 
Banfi et al. (2008) find evidence that the WTP for building efficiency enhancements 
generally exceed the cost of implementing these measures, and suggest that lack of 
information on the advantages and potential cost savings from energy efficiency 
measures explains the underinvestment.  
 Hassett and Metcalf (1993) show that it is possible to get substantially different 
discount rates for energy investments due to price uncertainty.4 In Chapter 6, I estimate 
discount rates for a hypothetical energy efficiency investment and for a non-energy 
income, using the same sample. 
                                                 
4 Most previous work assumes that an increase in the energy efficiency of household equipment will reduce energy 
demand. Changes in usage behavior that accompany energy investments, however, may have perverse effects on energy 
saving. The idea that a compensating consumption increase will diminish energy savings is called the “rebound effect.” 
Greening et al. (2000) find rebound effects ranging up to 50% of energy saved, suggesting that the anticipated savings 
may differ significantly from realized savings. Hsueh and Gerner (1993) document this effect for home heating demand 
in the United States, reporting that that savings estimates following attic or wall insulation may differ by as much as an 




D. Conservation and Energy Efficiency Investment 
 In the U.S., homes count for between 20 and 40% of total energy consumption, and 
heating represents 41% of this consumption (U.S. EIA, 2010). In general, a change in 
household energy demand can be achieved through conservation (for example, 
moderating the temperature in the home) or investment in energy efficiency (repairing or 
purchasing a more efficient heater). Energy efficiency can be defined as the ratio of 
useful energy services (e.g., heating or lighting) to the required energy input (Sorrell and 
Dimitropoulos, 2008). Studies suggest that conservation changes tend to be temporary 
and small (Barr et al., 2005). In contrast, household investments can significantly and 
permanently reduce the energy demand in the home (National Academy of Sciences, 
2010). In chapters 5 and 6, I study household investments in energy efficiency.  
 Economic theory dictates that the determinants of household energy consumption 
(such as dwelling and household characteristics, weather, income and prices) also explain 
energy investments (Fernandez, 2001). Using 1761 survey responses U.S. households, 
and a nested logit model with simulations, Cameron (1985) finds that consumer 
efficiency investment behavior is sensitive to price, especially heating fuel price. She 
finds that home insulation retrofits are elastic with respect to income, heating fuel price, 
and government subsidies. More recent evidence from Swiss households likewise 
suggests that the payback period for the investment, the upfront cost, and the availability 
of subsidies significantly influence residential energy efficiency investments (Jakob, 
2007a).  
 Alberini, Banfi and Ramseier (2011) find evidence that uncertainty about future 




renovations in homes. Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) find that uncertainty about the cost 
of equipment may discourage investment: extended policy discussions regarding 
efficiency incentives signal a lack of political commitment and raise the potential for 
policy reversal.  
 Fernandez (2000) and Fernandez (2001) use the Residential Energy Consumption 
Survey (RECS) and find that housing square footage, income, urban environment, and 
poor credit all significantly influence household investment in heating and cooling 
appliances. Those with larger homes are less likely to make investments in either electric 
space heaters or central air conditioning, and credit constrained households (those with a 
lower credit score) are more likely to purchase an electric space heater, which has a lower 
upfront cost but is less efficient, and therefore more expensive to operate in the long-run.  
 Numerous standards and incentives are currently targeted at energy efficiency in 
the residential sector.5 Such programs have met with mixed success. Geller et al. (2006) 
document the success of informational campaigns combined with labeling (e.g., 
“EnergyStar”) and financial incentives in the U.S., and of appliance standards used in 
Japan. Hassett and Metcalf (1995) use panel data from US taxpayers and find that a 24% 
increase in investment probability results from a 10% increase in tax incentives amount, 
but caution that subsidies may comprise a windfall for those households that would have 
invested anyway. In a separate paper, Hassett and Metcalf (1993) suggest that efficiency 
standards and taxes have greater effectiveness in altering behavior than subsidies alone. 
Turning to the effect of building efficiency standards, Jacobsen and Kotchen (2011) show 
                                                 




that tighter building standards decreased energy consumption by 4% to 6% in new 
Florida homes.  
  The matter of split incentives between renters and owners has received 
considerable attention. It is typically impractical for renters to take efficient appliances 
with them when they move, so there is reluctance among renters to invest in energy 
efficiency. Levinson and Niemann (2004) show that it can be privately optimal for a 
landlord to pay energy costs in inefficient rental units if the energy-inclusive rental 
contract exceeds the expected cost of energy. Even among those who pay their own 
energy bills, renters tend to be less energy-efficient. Using the RECS database, Davis 
(2010) finds that renters are 5 – 10% less likely to have efficient appliances, even while 
controlling for house and household characteristics. All else equal, lower efficiency 
results in higher consumption: Rehdanz (2007) finds that owner-occupied households 
spend 5 – 15% less on heating fuel than rental homes.  
 In Chapter 5, I focus on planned tenure in the home and its role in energy efficiency 
investment. Planned tenure time is often unobserved, so occupant age is sometimes used 
as proxy for current and planned tenure. However, occupant age may also be correlated 
with occupancy habits or demand for thermal comfort.6 Unsurprisingly, the evidence of 
the effect of age on investment is mixed. Brill et al. (1999) document an increased 
likelihood to make insulation investments if householders are elderly. Poortinga et al. 
(2003) report that elderly Dutch were much less likely to report a willingness to make 
                                                 
6 Age of the household has also been found to influence energy consumption and expenditures given the existing 
appliance stock. Meier and Rehdanz (2009) report that elderly British homes spend less on heating, but speculate that 
this may be due to smaller home size or income constraints rather than decreased demand. Liao and Chang (2002) 
document increased demand for space heating among the elderly, either due to different preferences for thermal 





hypothetical efficiency investments or conservation measures than others. Fernandez 
(2001) reports a negative correlation between age and household investment in electric 
space heaters and central air conditioners.  
 For a home or building owner, a critical determinant in the decision to invest is 
whether energy efficiency investments are capitalized into the value of the home or 
building. The evidence from the literature is mixed. Eichholtz et al. (2010) find that 
energy savings measures are capitalized into commercial buildings, but do not expand 
their analysis to include residential space. Laquatra et al. (2002) review several studies 
that show capitalization of varying magnitudes. Yet, absent a certified signal about the 
efficiency of the home, information asymmetry impedes the extent to which home 
efficiency is capitalized: a seller possesses information about home attributes and has an 
incentive to overstate energy efficiency; a potential buyer therefore views stated home 
efficiency with skepticism. As a result, energy efficiency may only be partly capitalized 
into the home price. Recent government programs seek to mitigate this information 
problem with energy performance labeling and reporting.7 Brounen and Kok (2011) show 
that such schemes can boost the capitalization of energy efficiency. Their study of Dutch 
homes finds a statistically significant sales premium for those homes with higher energy 
performance labels, even while controlling for other home characteristics associated with 
quality. 
Informing questions of durable good investment is an underlying decision about 
how long the household expects to occupy their home (Hausman, 1979, Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994). Existing policies to entice energy efficiency investments are most likely to appeal 
                                                 
7 The City of Austin, TX, implemented the Energy Conservation Audit and Disclosure (ECAD) Act in June 2009, 




to those who plan to be in the home for the foreseeable future or those who believe 
investments will be capitalized into home values. Absent regulation or disclosure 
requirements, homeowners may not expect to reap the full return on efficiency 
investments, and therefore factor in their planned tenure when making investment 
decisions: specifically, some homeowners may choose to underinvest in efficiency rather 
than risk losing money in the undercapitalization of efficiency at the point of home 
transaction. To capture this effect, I explicitly incorporate planned tenure in my model of 
investment. To my knowledge, no previous study has focused on the effect of planned 





Chapter 3: Residential Energy Demand Estimation Using 
American Housing Survey 8 
 
What are the determinants of residential energy consumption in the US, and how 
is consumption influenced by energy prices, weather, structural characteristics, household 
attributes, and energy efficiency investments? This is the fundamental question asked by 
academic and government researchers for the past 50 years. Historically, the paucity of 
the data has severely constrained the external validity of any conclusions. With few 
exceptions, the studies published heretofore are geographically specific, time-specific, 
and rely on cross-sectional data. While such studies undoubtedly inform our 
understanding of residential energy consumption, they have a short shelf-life. To address 
these shortcomings, I use a panel dataset spanning 10 years with unprecedented 
geographic coverage (the AHS data, see chapter 3.A).  
For the purpose of forecasting demand and planning for generation, transmission 
and distribution capacity, and for energy policy purposes, it is important to measure the 
responsiveness of residential energy demand to the prices of electricity and gas, the two 
major sources of residential energy in the US. Earlier research has examined household 
demand for energy and its responsiveness to price, but these analyses (i) used old data 
(Quigley and Rubinfeld, 1989, Metcalf and Hassett, 1999), (ii) are restricted to limited 
geographical areas (e.g., Garcia-Cerrutti, 2000; Reiss and Weiss, 2005), so that it is 
difficult to extrapolate their results to other areas with different climates, stock of housing 
and electricity suppliers, or (iii) were based on cross-sections or extremely short panels of 
data (with a maximum of two observations per household) (e.g., Metcalf and Hassett, 
                                                 




1999), and did not fully address issues of unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. In 
some cases, responsiveness to price was inferred from supply shocks so severe and 
geographically circumscribed (e.g., Bushnell and Mansur, 2005; Reiss and White, 2008) 
as to render them inapplicable for broader areas and more gradual price changes.  
For these reasons, in this chapter I wish to ask three research questions. First, 
what are the (nationwide) price elasticities of residential electricity and gas demand? 
Second, how does such responsiveness depend on equipment and energy choices that are 
not easily reversed (e.g., using gas or electricity for heating or cooling)? Third, how does 
household income influence demand and the price elasticities? 
A. American Housing Survey Data 
 To answer these questions, I use a large and comprehensive dataset based upon 
the American Housing Survey. The American Housing Survey (AHS) is a longitudinal 
study conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that follows 
dwellings (not households) nationwide. The AHS contains extensive information about 
the structural characteristics of the dwelling, renovations and retrofits, home ownership 
and its financial aspects (mortgages, maintenance costs, etc.), appliances and 
heating/cooling systems, socio-demographic and economic circumstances of the 
occupants, and their assessment of the quality of the home and the neighborhood.  
The nationwide “national” surveys are done every other year, and are 
supplemented by additional surveys in selected metro areas (47 different metropolitan 




2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007, which means that homes appear for up to T=6 periods.9  
This sample is augmented with observations from the AHS “metro”10 surveys, which are 
conducted in even years in specific areas. The 2002, 2004, and 2007 metro surveys are 
used. Homes in the metro surveys are surveyed only once, so our sample is a mix of 
panel data plus multi-year cross-sections.  
 Earlier studies of energy demand and household investment use cross-sectional 
data in limited geographic areas (e.g., Dubin and McFadden, 1984, Revelt and Train, 
1998), thus limiting the degree to which each household’s response to prices and other 
factors can be observed. Furthermore, with only 10% of households making appliances 
investments in any given year, a large sample is required to make any inference.11   
 Because of privacy concerns, the AHS discloses the location of the dwelling (i.e. 
the metro area) only if the area has a population of 100,000 or more. Attention is 
restricted to dwellings in the 54 cities corresponding to the 50 largest metropolitan areas 
in the U.S. as of 2008, unless the AHS SMSA identification makes it impossible to 
unambiguously identify the state in which the dwelling is located. Table 3.1 lists the 
metro areas included in the data. These locations should ensure considerable variation in 
climate, age of the stock of housing and construction materials (which may affect 
efficiency of space heating and cooling), and utility prices.  
                                                 
9 The 2009 survey-year of the data was not available for this chapter, but is incorporated into Chapter 4, where the 
maximum number of periods is T=7.  
 
10 The Nationwide AHS sample returns to the same homes for every survey, and adds some newly constructed homes to 
keep the sample representative of the housing stock in the U.S.. The metro surveys are conducted on a representative 
sample of homes in different cities every two years, but in the metro surveys different homes are selected in different 
waves for the same city, thus do not contribute to the panel. 
 





Table 3.1 Included metropolitan areas selected for the study  
Metro Area 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI3 
Austin-Round Rock, TX Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro--Franklin, TN 
Baltimore-Towson, MD New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA4 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Oklahoma City, OK 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC1 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI2 Pittsburgh, PA 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 
Columbus, OH Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA5 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Raleigh-Cary, NC 
Denver-Aurora, CO Richmond, VA 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville, CA 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX Salt Lake City, UT 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN San Antonio, TX 
Jacksonville, FL San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, 
FL 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 
Notes: (1) 1=Charlotte; 2=Chicago; 3=Minneapolis-St. Paul; 4=New York, Northern New Jersey; 5=Providence; (2) 
Excluded cities include: Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN; Kansas City, MO-KS; Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-
IN; Memphis, TN-MS-AR; Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD; St. Louis, MO-IL; Virginia Beach-
Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 
 
 My sample is composed of single-family homes and duplexes in the 50 largest 
major metropolitan areas in the U.S. with clearly distinguishable jurisdictional 
boundaries,12 for a total of 54 cities, 58 statistical metropolitan areas (SMSA), and 27 
states.13 Attention is restricted to single-family homes that are owner-occupied or 
occupied by a tenant, excluding residences where the heating equipment is shared with 
other units. The economic agent for my study is the household: I exclude multi-family 
                                                 
12 Because of the difficulty in identifying utility and state policy data, I excluded metro areas that straddle state lines 
(e.g., Washington, D.C., Kansas City, or Philadelphia).  
13 Large metropolitan areas can encompass more than one SMSA or city. The New York City metro area, for example, 
covers both Manhattan, part of Long island, and areas of Northern New Jersey. As a result, the sum total of cities and 




dwellings or those with shared energy-using equipment because consumption and 
incentives to invest will be different in these cases.  
 Observations were deleted where (i) the home was occupied as a residence for 
only part of the year, (ii) the utility bills had been imputed using “hot deck” procedures, 
(iii) the square footage (which should be an important determinant of energy usage) had 
been imputed using “hot deck” procedures, and/or (iv) large and implausible changes in 
square footage were observed from one time period to the next.14 Finally, I exclude from 
the sample dwellings less than 400 or more than 10,000 square feet (N = 1770), with 
more than four floors (N = 2001). The resulting sample size is 98,772 observations on 
69,169 dwelling units. Table 3.2 displays the distribution of this final sample by city.15  
  
                                                 
14 Specifically, observations were excluded if the amount of energy or gas used that changed by more than 500% from 
one period to the next, while at the same time no renovation in the home and no square foot change was reported. 
Homes that experienced a change in square footage of more than 1000% from one period to the next, or with a change 
in square footage of more than 100% without a reported renovation to the home, were also discarded.  
 
15 For ease of exposition, this table shows only data used in Chapter 4 (e.g. excluding the year 2009 data). The 




Table 3.2 Distribution of the sample by city (N=98,772) 
City Nobs Percent City Nobs Percent 
Anaheim 3,618 3.66 Minneapolis 2,112 2.14 
Atlanta 3,335 3.38 Monmouth 339 0.34 
Austin 193 0.20 Nashville 275 0.28 
Baltimore 1,522 1.54 New Orleans 2,387 2.42 
Bergen-Passaic 428 0.43 New York 2,585 2.62 
Birmingham 343 0.35 Newark 612 0.62 
Boston 1,754 1.78 Northern New Jersey 659 0.67 
Boulder 91 0.09 Oakland 793 0.80 
Buffalo 1,739 1.76 Oklahoma City 2,752 2.79 
Charlotte 2,681 2.71 Orlando 434 0.44 
Chicago 4,306 4.36 Phoenix 3,665 3.71 
Cleveland 3,137 3.18 Pittsburgh 3,313 3.35 
Columbus 3,315 3.36 Providence 271 0.27 
Dallas 3,488 3.53 Raleigh-Durham 280 0.28 
Denver 2,415 2.45 Riverside San Bernardino 3,883 3.93 
Detroit 3,467 3.51 Sacramento 2,584 2.62 
Ft. Worth 2,992 3.03 Salt Lake 532 0.54 
Hartford 2,010 2.03 San Antonio 2,781 2.82 
Houston 2,430 2.46 San Diego 2,978 3.02 
Indianapolis 2,908 2.94 San Francisco 502 0.51 
Jacksonville 357 0.36 San Jose 579 0.59 
Jersey City 91 0.09 Santa Rosa 90 0.09 
Las Vegas 453 0.46 Seattle 2,706 2.74 
Los Angeles 4,870 4.93 Tacoma 224 0.23 
Miami 4,115 4.17 Tampa 2,089 2.11 
Middlesex County 300 0.30 Tucson 355 0.36 
Milwaukee 2,295 2.32 West Palm Beach 339 0.34 
 
 Table 3.3 summarizes information about the longitudinal component of the 
sample, examining the case where the cross-sectional units are the dwellings, and that 
where the cross-sectional units are dwelling-families (households). There are a total of 
69,169 homes and 74,697 households (because families may move into and out of any 







Table 3.3 Distribution by length of the longitudinal component (N=98,772) 
Length of the panel 
Dwellings Households 
N Percent N Percent 
1 58,088 58.81 63,916 64.71 
2 7,094 7.18 9,616 9.74 
3 5,315 5.38 6,126 6.20 
4 8,232 8.33 6,236 6.31 
5 10,905 11.04 6,740 6.82 
6 9,138 9.25 6,138 6.21 
Total Unique 69,169 74,697 
 
A.1 Energy Consumption and Utilities’ Rates 
The AHS reports the average monthly utilities bills from the previous year, but 
does not include electricity or gas rates, or the actual energy consumption (in kiloWatt–
hours kWh for electricity and thousand cubic feet Mcf for gas). It is necessary to construct 
consumption by taking the bills and dividing them by unit price. Unfortunately, the 
names of the utilities and the rate structure are not identified in the AHS either, so 
average tariffs were imputed for each dwelling in a number of ways. 
For each metropolitan area, the relevant gas and electric utilities were identified 
(listings appear on the state’s public utility commission, and on a variety of on-line city 
services), and utility-level price information was obtained from the Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) 861 forms (for electricity) and EIA 176 forms (for gas), which the utilities 
are required to file every year with the agency. Next, if the area was supplied by a single 




from sales to residential customers divided by the kWhs (MCFs) sold to residential 
customers.16  
 If the area was supplied by more than one utility, the utility average price was 
calculated in the aforementioned fashion, then three alternative measures of price were 
constructed. The first is “residential price 1,” a weighted average of each utility’s average 
tariff per KWh, where the weights are proportional to the utility’s customer base. The 
second, “residential price 2,” is also a weighted average, with weights assigned to 
represent the utility’s dominance of the market.17 Finally, “residential price 3” is a simple 
average of the individual utilities’ average tariffs.18 A similar approach was used for gas 
utilities.  
 The electricity and gas prices are used in two ways. First, I use them to create the 
dependent variables in our regressions: Consumption of electricity and gas are obtained 
as the amount on the bill divided by (nominal) price. Second, (real) prices enter in the 
right-hand side of the demand equations.  
 Technically speaking, these average prices are not necessarily equal to the prices 
faced by the households. The majority of the utilities apply block pricing, but with such a 
geographically broad sample and such a long study period, it would be unfeasible to 
obtain the block pricing schemes used by each utility in each period. The only remaining 
econometric concern is that the price used in the regression is measured with error. This 
                                                 
16 The EIA computes state-level electricity prices and gas prices exactly in this fashion—by taking the revenues of all 
utilities and dividing by all kWhs (or gas) served to residential households.  
 
17 If a utility dominates the market completely, despite the nominal existence of other utilities, that utility received a 
weight of ones and the others weights equal to zero. If two utilities were perceived to share the market in the area in a 
relatively equitable fashion, we assigned weights of 0.5 to each.  
 




would make the household demand appear to be more elastic than it truly is. Steps were 
taken as explained in section [3.D], to account for this. 
 Descriptive statistics about prices and energy use are displayed table 3.4. 
Attention is restricted to the “price 1” variables because the others were very close to 
them.19 Every home is served by electricity, and, as shown in table 3.4, on average 
households use about 930 KWh per month. This is in line with nationwide estimates 
collected by the Department of Energy using a dedicated survey (RECS). Just over three-
quarters of the sample (76.6%) use natural gas as well, and almost 88% of such natural-
gas connected households use gas heat. In a typical month, gas usage is 7.27 MCF.  
 Over the study period, the average price of electricity is about 11 cents per kWh 
(2007$). However, there is evidence of considerable variation across states. The state 
with the lowest prices is Indiana (about 6.8 cents per kWh on average over the study 
period) and that with the highest prices is New York, where a kWh averaged almost 18 
cents over the study period (2007$). The price of natural gas exhibits similar variability 
across locales. The average price per MCF is $11.41 (2007$), with Georgia exhibiting the 
lowest prices ($6.10, 2007$, on average) and Florida the highest ($17.83, 2007$).  
Since I exploit the longitudinal feature of the data, it is important to check the 
extent of the variation in prices across and within units. In what follows, the units are the 
dwellings. I computed the total variation of real electricity prices and of log real 
electricity prices, and in each case the variation within dwellings accounted for only 4% 
of the total variation.20 Gas prices are more variable over time: the “within” dwelling 
                                                 
19 The correlation coefficients between the “price 1” variables and the others were generally higher than 0.97.  
 





variation accounts for about 14% of total variation in real gas prices, and 15% of the total 
variation for log real gas prices. 
Table 3.4 Prices and monthly consumption of electricity and natural gas 
Variable label Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
kwh1 
monthly electricity usage 
(KWh) 
97344 930.39 654.09 11.06 5697.54 
gasuse1 
monthly gas usage  
(MCF) 
67154 7.27 5.50 0.23 71.86 
residentialprice1_r 
price of electricity per 
kWh (2007 dollars) 
98487 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.22 
gasprice1_r 
price of natural gas per 
MCF (2007 dollars) 
94315 11.42 3.10 3.90 22.89 
Log kwh1 97344 6.61 0.70 2.40 8.65 
Log gasuse1 67154 1.75 0.68 -1.49 4.27 
Log residentialprice1_r 98487 -2.23 0.26 -2.92 -1.49 
Log gasprice1_r 94315 2.40 0.26 1.36 33 
 
A.2 Other Determinants of Energy Use 
The weather is an important determinant of energy use. Weather data were 
gathered using the T3 Summaries of the Day from NOAA’s National Climatic Data 
Center and merged with AHS. Each metro area was matched with the T3 monitors in that 
area, and I retrieved the mean temperatures for each day of the year prior to the date of 
the survey. I use these mean temperatures to calculate the heating and cooling degree-
days (HDDs and CDDs) for each day, which are 65F minus the average temperature 
(average temperature minus 65F), then sum daily HDDs and CDDs over the year prior 
to the survey.21 This construction is the same as that used by the US Department of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 In the AHS, reported expenditures on energy are annual averages, so it is appropriate to include weather averages for 




Energy. The average HDDs and CDDs are 3450 and 1658 degree-days, respectively, with 
good variation in climate across the entire sample (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Map of Distribution of AHS Sample 
 Both energy demand and demand for energy efficiency renovations should depend 
on the structural characteristics of the dwelling. I have the age and size of the home, 
number of rooms, and number of floors, which come from the AHS. Descriptive statistics 
for these variables are displayed in table 3.5. The average size of the home is about 2000 




homes and homes that are part of a two-unit building from the 1997, 2001, and 2005 
RECS.22  
Table 3.5 House characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Square footage 91254 2073.96 1615.04 99 18083 
Basement (dummy) 98772 0.37 0.48 0 1 
No. Floors 98772 1.83 0.96 1 21 
No. Rooms 98772 6.42 1.86 1 21 
Age of the home 98772 38.69 23.27 0 88 
 
 Descriptive statistics about heating and cooling equipment, as well as appliances 
that use energy, are reported in table 3.6. All of this information comes from the AHS. 
Briefly, in terms of heating, about 67% of the sample has a gas heating system, 26% 
relies on electricity for heating, and about 5% on heating oil as the main source of heat. 
Homes with electric heat are located primarily in states with mild or warm climates, such 
as Arizona (66% of all Arizona homes), Florida (93.80%), Louisiana (43%), Tennessee 
(59%) and Texas (43.76%), or cheap electricity (e.g., Washington, 29%).  
 About 84% of the sample has some type of air conditioning, and about 67% has 
central air conditioning. Window units are used by 20% of the sample, sometimes 
alongside with central air conditioning. Only 2% of the observations have gas-powered 
heat pumps. 
                                                 
22 Note that a value of zero for the age of the house is correct: it means that the home was built in the same year of the 
survey. (The AHS does add new dwellings to mirror the stock of housing and new constructions. Homes with age 0 





 Turning to appliances, virtually all homes have a fridge, almost 72% a 
dishwasher, 32% use gas-powered clothes dryers, and a little more than half of the 
sample has an electric stove.  
Table 3.6 Heating and cooling equipment and appliances 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gas heat 98772 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Electric heat 98772 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Heating oil heat 98772 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Window A/C units 98772 0.21 0.40 0 1 
Number of rooms with A/C 20251 1.78 1.02 1 8 
Central A/C 98772 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Gas heat pump for A/C 98772 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Any type of A/C present 98772 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Refrigerator 98772 1.00 0.04 0 1 
Dishwasher 98772 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Gas powered clothes dryer 98772 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Electric stove 98772 0.53 0.50 0 1 
   
 In my sample, the average household income is about $88,000 (2007$). There are 
a small number of households (93, or 0.09%) that report negative income. When these 
observations are removed, the distribution of household income is essentially unchanged: 
The new sample average is still $88,000 (2007$).23 The average household size is 2.8, 
31% of the sample has small children, 22% has at least one person aged 65 or older living 
in this house, and almost 84% owns the home. Summary statistics of household 
characteristics are shown in table 3.7. 
 
 
                                                 





Table 3.7 Household characteristics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household income in thou. 2007$ 98772 87.92 115.49 -42.33 11473.2 
Number of household members 98772 2.81 1.52 1 17 
Young child (12 or less) lives in this house 
(dummy) 
98772 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Elderly person (65+) lives in this house 98772 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Owner (dummy) 98772 0.84 0.37 0 1 
 
B. Estimation Strategy  
To answer my research questions, I estimate a model of residential energy 
demand (see equation 3.1). I assume that consumers have as their energy source both 
electricity and natural gas, but exclude other fuels.24 The model posits that the main 
determinants of energy usage are: price, weather fluctuations and housing characteristics, 
household income, and number and age of residents. I include all of these determinants in 
the right hand side of my demand equations.  
I estimate both a static and dynamic model. The static model is the specification 
most prevalent in the literature for reasons described above: namely, panel data was not 
available. I include it here primarily as a benchmark to these studies. A static model, 
while operationally expedient and possible to estimate in spite of limited data, is guided 
by very strong assumptions. The most problematic is that of fixed stock. In essence, a 
static model assumes that households cannot and do not adjust the structural 
characteristics of the home or energy-using equipment in response to energy price 
changes. Nevertheless, in the short-term, this may be an entirely appropriate assumption. 
The static model estimated here is:  
                                                 
24 In my sample, 5.8% of customers use other fuels. The analysis is performed with and without these customers. The 




ln 	 ln , ln ,      (3.1) 
where j=E, G for electricity and gas, respectively, i denotes the dwelling, and t denotes 
the time period. Q is consumption, P denotes price, and the coefficients on the log prices 
are the short-term own- and cross-price elasticities. Here the price of the substitute 
energy source is included. For example, if j refers to electricity, then equation 4.1 would 
explain the consumption of electricity in terms of the explanatory characteristics of the 
home and use, the electric price PE, and the natural gas (substitute) price PG.  
 Vector x is comprised of dwelling and household characteristics thought to 
influence the consumption of energy, such as weather, size and age of the home, heating 
and cooling equipment dummies, and appliances. For example, a house heated only with 
electricity would have a higher electricity demand than an identical home with gas heat. 
Household characteristics included in x are the number and age of occupants, income, 
the presence of children or elderly persons,25 and a homeownership dummy. Equation 
(3.1) includes year effects (the s), and is easily amended to include dwelling or city-
specific effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity.26 The results from the static 
model are reported in columns A through G in table 3.8 (table 3.9 for natural gas).  
 It is of interest to assess how consumption changes if individuals are allowed to 
adjust their stock of appliances and make energy efficiency and conservation 
                                                 
25 Earlier literature has examined the effect of age, race and ethnicity on energy demand. Poyer and Williams (1993) 
find that while the demand is inelastic for all groups, blacks appear to be more sensitive to short-run price variations 
than Hispanics and whites. Liao and Chang (2002) find that the elderly require more natural gas and fuel oil but less 
electricity, the demand for space heating increases as the elderly get older, and the demand for energy for heating water 
decreases with age. 
 
26 A special case of this situation is when the dwelling-specific effects are suppressed, but the error terms in the 
demand for electricity and gas equations are correlated within the same dwelling unit in the same period (but 
uncorrelated in different period and across dwellings).  If so, the equations for log Q(E) and log Q(G) are part of a 
system of seemingly unrelated regression equation. Since the regressors are the same in the equations for log 
electricity and gas consumption, the most efficient estimation technique (GLS) is simplified to OLS applied separately 




investments. A partial-adjustment model (Houthakker, 1980) lets individuals adjust their 
stock of appliances and energy-efficiency investments. This model assumes that the 
change in log actual demand between any two periods (t−1 and t) is only some fraction 
(λ) of the difference between log actual demand in period t−1 and the log of the long-run 
equilibrium demand in period t, ∗. Formally, 
ln ln ln ∗ ln                                 (3.2) 
where 0<λ<1. The dwelling subscript, i, and the electricity or gas equation superscript, j, 
are omitted to avoid clutter. This implies that given an optimum, but unobservable, level 
of energy consumption, demand only gradually converges towards that optimum level 
between any two time periods.  
Assume that desired energy use (for example, desired electricity consumption) 
can be expressed as ∗ 	exp	 , where  and  are the long-term elasticities 
with respect to the price of the electricity and that of gas, and x is the vector of variables 
influencing demand for energy, including income, climate, characteristics of the stock of 
housing, income, etc. Inserting this expression into (3.2) yields  
ln ln lnα ln ln ln 		  (3.3) 
Re-arranging and appending an econometric error term produces the regression equation: 
ln lnα ln ln 1 ln 		       (3.4) 
 Equation (3.4) shows that the short-run elasticities are the regression coefficients 
on the log prices, whereas the long-run elasticities can be computed by dividing these 
short-run elasticities (i.e., the coefficients on the log prices) by the estimate of . In turn, 




C. Estimation of the Dynamic Model 
 I wish to estimate the partial adjustment model (equation 3.4) with fixed, 
dwelling-specific effects. One concern with this specification is that the lagged 
dependent variable in the right-hand side may be serially correlated and hence correlated 
with the error term, which makes the LSDV and GLS estimators biased and inconsistent, 
since , ,  is correlated with ̅ , where , ln ,  and ,  is 
the average of the ,  terms for unit i,  (see Baltagi, 2001). The bias vanishes as T gets 
large, but the LSDV estimator remains biased and inconsistent for N large and T small, 
as is the case here, since I have tens of thousands of homes but the maximum length of 
the longitudinal component of the sample is 6.27 
Kiviet (1995) derives an approximation for the bias of the LSDV estimator when 
the errors are serially uncorrelated and the regressors are strongly exogenous, and 
proposes an estimator that is derived by subtracting a consistent estimate of this bias from 
the LSDV estimator. An alternative approach is to first-difference the data, thus swiping 
out the state-specific effects: 
Δ ∆ , Δ Δ                          (3.5) 
where w denotes all exogenous regressors in the right-hand side of equation (3.4), and to 
use ,  and Δ  as instruments for ∆ ,  (Anderson and Hsiao, 1982). 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) point out that the latter approach is inefficient and 
argue that additional instruments can be obtained by exploiting the orthogonality 
conditions that exist between the lagged values of  and the disturbances. The Arellano-
                                                 
27 Restricting attention to those dwellings that appeared in more than one round of AHS survey yields an unbalanced 





Bond procedure is a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that is 
implemented in two steps. In practice, the Arellano-Bond estimator has been shown to be 
biased in small samples, and the bias increases with the number of instruments and 
orthogonality conditions. Moreover, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that the asymptotic 
approximation of the standard errors of their two-step GMM estimator is biased 
downwards, and they, as well as Judson and Owen (1999), find that the one-step 
estimator outperforms the two-step estimator.  
Under the additional assumption of quasi-stationarity of , ∆ ,   is 
uncorrelated with , and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest a “system” GMM 
estimation where one stacks the model in the levels and in the first differences, imposes 
the cross-equation restriction that the coefficients entering in the two models be the same, 
and uses the full set of instruments (corresponding to the full set of orthogonality 
conditions for both models). Blundell and Bond report that in simulation the “system” 
GMM estimator is more efficient and stable than the Arellano-Bond procedure. This is 
the approach I adopt for the partial adjustment model. 
D. Mismeasured Prices 
In this study the price of energy is measured with an error, because I do not 
know the exact price(s) faced by the household and impute the average price paid by 
residential customers in that area. Standard econometric theory shows when a regressor 
is mismeasured, and the measurement error is classical, the estimated regression 
coefficient is downward biased (Greene, 2008, page 325-326). Here, the mismeasured 




of the model as a regressor. Omitting for simplicity all other regressors and the cross 
price, I estimate the regression equation: 
ln ∗ β ln
∗
                                          (3.6) 
Where subscript i denotes the dwelling, A is the utility bill at time t, ∗  is nominal price, 
and CPI is the CPI index that converts nominal prices to real prices.28 In this simplified 
model, the own-price elasticity is . Variable ∗  is mismeasured. Specifically, I assume 
that ∗ exp , so ln ∗ ln . 
Equation (3.6) can be re-written as 
ln 1 β ln ∗ β	ln β ln ∗ β 	ln   (3.7)  
where	β 1  and 	β . The elasticity with respect to price is thus the LSDV 
coefficient on log price, β , minus 1.  
Is this estimate consistent or biased? Suppose that the measurement error is 
approximately constant within a dwelling over time. If this is the case, then the 
measurement error is swiped out by the LSDV procedure, which produces consistent 
estimates of the slopes in equation (3.1).  
Consider now the situation where the measurement error is completely 
uncorrelated within and between the units in every period. If the measurement error is 
classical, then it can be shown that  
 
	β ∙ ∙ ,
∙ , ∙
           (3.8) 
                                                 
28 City-level Consumer Price Indices are taken from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) at 
http://www.bls.gov/data/ by selecting “urban consumer series” for all items. Prices are then divided by the ratio of the 




where variances and covariances are computed using the deviations from the dwelling 
means. Clearly, β  underestimates the true 	(i.e., is biased towards zero), and so, since 
 is negative and 1, the price elasticity will be overstated (i.e., the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficient will be greater than | |).29 
 Equation (3.7) also shows that the price elasticity is the negative of the coefficient 
on ln CPI. Unfortunately, this coefficient is estimated consistently using LSDV only if ln 
CPI is uncorrelated with the log price of electricity, or (as shown in expressions (3.9)-
(3.10) below), 1. In my case, ln CPI is positively correlated with the log price of 
electricity (correlation coefficient 0.37), and  is likely different from -1, and so the bias 
induced by the measurement error on price is propagated to the coefficient on ln CPI. For 
large samples,  




        (3.10) 
Again, in expression (3.10) variances and covariances are based on deviations 
from the dwelling means. It is difficult to sign the bias, because it depends on the 
magnitude of the true elasticity. In my case, term m in expression (3.10) is clearly 
positive. Term	 1  is positive if the true price elasticity is negative but small (i.e., 
| | 1), in which case β  is biased away from zero, and its opposite ( ) 
overstates the true elasticity. If the true elasticity  is large (i.e., greater than 1 in absolute 
                                                 
29 Note that this is only the case when | | 1. An elasticity greater than one in absolute value leads to an 




value), then term 1  is negative, β  is biased towards zero and its opposite 
understates the true elasticity. 
How can one get around the mismeasurement problem? One approach is to 
restrict estimation to areas where mismeasurement is likely to be less severe (e.g., areas 
with only one utility). Another is to instrument for ln ∗ , which I do using state-level 
electricity and gas prices, or, in alternate runs, lagged electricity prices. The results 
obtained in this fashion can be compared with those from equation (3.1) directly, and 
with those from equation (3.7).  
E. Results 
Results for several specifications of the static model (see equation 3.1) are 
reported in table 3.8 for log electricity consumption, and in table 3.9 for log gas 
consumption. All include the prices of gas and electricity, structural characteristics of the 
home (log square footage, age of the home and age squared, number of floors, number of 
rooms), household characteristics (log household income, log number of household 
members, whether children or elderly persons are present), heating system and air 
conditioner type, appliances, and log CDD and HDD. I also control for whether the 





Table 3.8 Static model (Dependent: log of electricity usage) 
 









Log elec price -0.860*** -0.667*** -0.681*** -0.685*** -0.692*** -0.679** -0.825*** -9.37 -9.69 -8.16 -8.26 -6.82 -3.22 -8.12 
Log gas price 0.117* 0.122* 0.139* 0.115* 0.107 0.126* 0.102 2.02 2.45 2.36 1.97 1.58 2.04 1.63 
Log sq. ft. 0.216*** 0.0593 0.0522 0.0538 0.0396 0.226*** 0.220*** 11.05 1.64 1.21 1.29 0.81 7.12 9.15 
Age of Home 0.00553*** -0.00477 -0.00195 -0.00164 -0.000416 0.00685*** 0.00517*** 8.38 -1.70 -0.53 -0.48 -0.09 7.44 7.39 
Age of Home^2  -5.4E-05*** 4.91E-05 3.07E-05 1.54E-05 4.86E-06 -6.32E-05*** -4.98E-05*** -7.56 1.69 0.81 0.43 0.1 -5.19 -6.80 
Owns the Home 0.0696*** -0.0558 0.0408 -0.0803 0.0215 0.0899** 0.0518** 4.86 -1.69 0.7 -1.79 0.26 3.33 3.25 
No. of Rooms 0.0659*** 0.0159*** 0.0103 0.0202*** 0.013 0.0701*** 0.0626*** 14.74 3.42 1.94 3.39 1.91 8.14 14.07 
N. of Floors -0.0171* 0.0371 0.0297 0.0425 0.0297 -0.0524** 0.00476 -2.07 1.34 0.85 1.29 0.71 -3.35 0.59 
Log Income 0.0225*** 0.00906* 0.00677 0.0107* 0.00804 0.0251*** 0.0208*** 8.83 2.3 1.49 2.12 1.38 6.1 8.08 
Young child 
dummy 
0.0963*** 0.0721*** 0.0353 0.0614** 0.0335 0.0913*** 0.0964*** 
15.06 4.24 1.48 2.82 1.09 11.36 11.93 
Elderly dummy  -0.0390*** -0.0204 -0.00932 -0.0137 -0.00911 -0.0154 -0.0400*** -4.20 -0.88 -0.32 -0.49 -0.25 -0.95 -4.22 
Log CDD 0.0727*** 0.0299 0.025 0.0417 0.0272 0.141** 0.0762** 3.58 1.07 0.78 1.2 0.68 3.14 3.33 
Log HDD 0.0035 -0.0123 0.00277 -0.0278 -0.0244 0.0393 0.0384 0.07 -0.39 0.07 -0.58 -0.42 0.63 0.54 
Gas Heat dummy -0.0990** -0.0152 -0.0183 -0.00105 -0.0704 -2.79 -0.17 -0.18 -0.01 -0.56 
Electric Heat 
dummy 
0.154*** 0.106 0.123 0.117 0.0722 
4.72 1.23 1.2 1.09 0.57   
Heating oil heat 
dummy  
-0.0971* 0.00475 0.103 0.023 0.0945 
-2.28 0.04 0.64 0.15 0.51   
A/C 0.161*** 0.0572* 0.0493 0.0566 0.0445 0.0928* 0.176*** 8.0 2.21 1.61 1.71 1.15 2.63 8.61 
Constant 1.422** 4.053*** 3.861*** 4.000*** 4.212*** 1.510* 1.094 2.72 7.61 6.07 5.64 4.97 2.12 1.49 







R-squared 0.457 0.0557 0.0491 0.0564 0.0481 0.418 0.407 
N. of cases 82905 82905 82905 48027 48027 22003 55688 
Clustered City dwelling dwelling dwelling dwelling city city 





Table 3.9 Static model (Dependent: log of gas usage)  
 









Log elec price 0.150* 0.0376 -0.0334 0.0763 0.0192 0.461 0.128* 2.15  0.48 -0.36  0.78  0.16  1.49  2.12 
Log gas price -0.693*** -0.565*** -0.577*** -0.583*** -0.587*** -0.634*** -0.693*** -6.57 -9.51 -8.21 -8.31 -7.24 -4.52 -6.45 
Log sq. ft. 0.189*** 0.0524 0.0459 0.049 0.0439 0.120* 0.201***  9.88  1.26  0.89  1.03  0.76  2.33  10.25 
Age of the home 0.00383*** 0.0000321 0.000597 -0.0000686 -0.000542 0.00252 0.00384***  5.87  0.01  0.15 -0.02 -0.12  1.06  5.85 
Age of the home^2 -9.11 E-06 6.84E-06 1.68E-05 6.19E-06 2.01E-05 -1.07E-05 -7.25E-06 -1.30  0.22  0.42  0.16  0.42 -0.47 -1.05 
Owns the Home 0.0322* -0.0426 -0.00991 -0.0331 -0.00764 0.00436 0.0412**  2.56 -1.08 -0.14 -0.61 -0.07  0.15  3.28 
N. of Rooms 0.0549*** 0.0149** 0.0125 0.0171* 0.014 0.0695*** 0.0536***  18.61  2.72  1.93  2.51  1.74  7.37  17.83 
N. of Floors 0.00974 0.0573 0.0485 0.0645 0.0673  0.0224 0.00998  1.18  1.75  1.09  1.72  1.32  0.62  1.3 
Log Household 
Income 
0.00357 0.00285 0.00298 0.00446 0.00313  0.0095 0.00497* 
 1.61  0.6  0.55  0.74  0.47  1.40  2.2 
Young child dummy 0.0711*** 0.0635** 0.0657* 0.0658* 0.0813* 0.0549*** 0.0683*** 12.01 3.05 2.25 2.44  2.18 3.73 11.12 
Elderly dummy  0.0640*** -0.00246 0.00278 -0.00266 -0.000376 0.0574* 0.0659*** 7.23 -0.10  0.08 -0.08 -0.01 2.53 7.4 
Log CDD -0.00384 -0.0262 -0.00987 -0.0189 0.000143 0.105 0.00162 -0.13 -0.85 -0.28 -0.49 0  1.24  0.06 
Log HDD 0.0991 0.105* 0.114 0.192* 0.198*  0.0936 0.149**  1.67  1.99  1.93  2.2  2.15 1.15  2.83 
Gas Heat dummy  0.215*** -0.0797 -0.089 -0.0855 -0.108 4.2 -0.55 -0.48 -0.36 -0.45 
Electric Heat 
dummy  
0.0211 -0.225 -0.226 -0.237 -0.229 
0.47 -1.47 -1.15 -0.95 -0.90 
Heating oil heat 
dummy 
-0.938*** -0.730** -0.564* -0.677 -0.506 
-11.47 -2.82 -1.99 -1.91 -1.36 
A/C -0.0147 0.0171 0.00614 -0.000232 -0.0155 -0.0348 -0.0154 -0.94 0.62 0.18 -0.01 -0.36 -1.09 -1.01 
Constant 0.214 1.931** 1.587* 1.334 1.05 3.746** 0.206 0.35 2.76  1.97  1.29  0.95 2.79  0.33 







R-squared 0.438 0.0497 0.0465 0.0556 0.0512 0.25 0.429 
N. of cases 59492 59492 59492 34371 34371 5176 53027 
std. err. clustering city dwelling dwelling dwelling dwelling city city 





The runs differ for the type of effects I include to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. I choose to report results for fixed city-, dwelling- and dwelling-family 
specific effects. I include city-specific effects because 1) the coefficients on most 
regressors are similar to those from a random effects model with dwelling-specific effects 
(estimated using GLS), 2) it stands to reason that homes and people might share similar 
unobservable characteristics as other homes and people in the same metro area, 3) I do 
not lose the observations with T=1, and 4) I am able to assess the impact on consumption 
of factors that vary widely across locales (e.g., home size, income, etc.) but little within a 
house over time. 
Fixed dwelling effects are a natural candidate, since the AHS follows a dwelling 
over time, while dwelling-family effects allow for unobservable heterogeneity to depend 
on the household as well as the home. I prefer fixed effects because Hausman tests 
indicate that if the unobserved heterogeneity is modeled using random effects, these are 
correlated with the included regressors, which makes the GLS estimates inconsistent. For 
good measure, the standard errors are clustered around the city (in specifications with city 
effects) or dwelling (in specifications with dwelling and dwelling-household effects).  
Starting with table 3.8, most of the coefficients are significant and have the 
expected sign. Importantly, column (A)—the results of a model with city-specific 
effects—shows that the elasticity of electricity use with respect to the price of electricity 
is -0.860, and the cross-elasticity with respect to the price of gas is positive and equal to 
0.117, indicating that the two are substitutes.30  
                                                 
30 It is useful to compare these figures with their counterparts in an OLS regression that ignores unobserved 
heterogeneity. The own price elasticity when the city effects are suppressed is -1. Adding state effects (but no city 




Consumption of electricity increases by 22% for every 10% increase in the square 
footage of the home, is 16% higher if the home has air conditioning, and about 15% 
higher if the home is heated using electricity. Dishwashers and electrical stoves increase 
usage by 8% and 7%, respectively (not displayed in the table). F tests reject the null 
hypotheses that heating/cooling systems are jointly equal to zero (F statistic = 37.65, p 
value less than 0.0001) and that the appliances are not associated with electricity 
consumption (F statistic = 38.05, p value less than 0.0001). 
The income elasticity of electricity consumption is only about 2%. One reason for 
such a low elasticity might be the fact that income is highly correlated with 
characteristics of the home, such as the size, the number of floors, and the presence of 
certain appliances. Once I removed these from the specification, income elasticity of 
electricity usage increased to almost 5%.  
Column (B) presents the results of a FE specification where the cross-sectional 
units are the homes. The own price elasticity is lower (-0.667), as expected, but the cross-
price elasticity is slightly stronger. As expected, the coefficients on most other variables 
are much smaller than their counterparts in the city-specific effects specification, because 
these variables rarely change within a home over time. In column (C), I present the 
results of a model with dwelling-household specific effects. They are similar to those in 
column (B), with slightly stronger own- and cross-price elasticities.  
In the gas equation, columns (A)-(C) of table 3.9 show that the own price 
elasticity ranges from -0.693 (city-specific effects) to -0.565 (dwelling-specific effects). 
The model with dwelling-household effects produces a price elasticity of -0.577. The 




substitutes in the model with city-specific effects (column (A)), but turns insignificant 
when I use dwelling-specific effects, and negative and insignificant in the model with 
dwelling-family effects.  
The model with city-specific effects indicates that gas usage increases by 19% for 
every 10 percentage point increase in the square footage of the home, and is about 24% 
larger in homes with gas heating systems. The impact of these variables is small and 
statistically insignificant in the variants with dwelling- and dwelling-household effects.31  
F. Robustness checks 
 My first order of business is to examine the size of the potential bias due to 
measurement errors in the prices of electricity and gas. To see if such bias is severe, I 
began with regressions where the sample is restricted to metro areas served by one utility. 
I argue that the measurement error due to our price imputation procedure is the smallest. 
For electricity usage, the results of these runs are reported in columns (D) and (E) of table 
3.8 for the models with dwelling-specific effects and dwelling-family effects. Similar 
models for gas usage are displayed in columns (D) and (E) of table 3.9. Clearly, the own-
price elasticities are very close (and slightly higher than) to their counterparts in columns 
(B) and (C).  
Next, focusing on electricity usage for the sake of simplicity, I estimated a 
regression that is similar to those reported in table 3.8 and includes fixed dwelling-
                                                 
31 Including regional price interactions in these specifications reveals some differences in the nature of demand. Adding 
regional price interactions to specification C in table 3.8 reveals an own price elasticity for electricity demand of -0.55 
for the basis (West), with homes in the South having a statistically significant interaction term coefficient of 0.43, 
equivalent to a much lower price elasticity of -0.12 for the region. For gas, specification 3.9C with added interactions 
reveals an own price elasticity of gas demand of -0.6, with Midwest homes having a significantly lower elasticity: a 
coefficient of 0.23 (price elasticity of -0.37). These findings may be explained by the heavy usage of air conditioning in 




specific effects, but omits the price of gas. The “within” (LSDV) estimator results in an 
estimated own price elasticity of -0.6794 (which is very close to the coefficient in (B) in 
table 3.8, where I do include the price of gas). When I instrument for log electricity price 
using the log of the state average prices of electricity and gas as the identifying 
instruments, the coefficient on log price is -.67907.32 Using log state-level electricity 
price as the only identifying instrument produces an own price elasticity of electricity 
demand of  -0.6584, while replacing that the first lag of log price of electricity in the 
metro area yields an elasticity of  -0.6108.  
Finally, I estimated a model similar to equation (3.7), namely one where the 
dependent variable is log electricity bill, the right-hand side includes fixed dwelling-
specific effects, all other controls, the log of nominal electricity price and the log of the 
CPI (but no gas price). The coefficient on log nominal electricity price is 0.3223 and that 
on log CPI is 0.5981. The corresponding estimates of the elasticity with respect to the 
price of electricity are -0.6777 (= 0.3223 - 1) and -0.5891. Although I argue in section 
3.C that these are both likely to overstate the true elasticity, they are within 10-15% of the 
original estimates and of the IV estimates of the price elasticity, suggesting that the 
impact of measurement error is modest. 
To check if consumption depends on current or recent prices, I also estimated 
models similar to the ones shown in tables 3.8 and 3.9, but where I further included 
lagged prices. I found that (i) the coefficients on contemporaneous price were strongly 
significant and similar to their counterparts in table 3.8 and 3.9, and (ii) the coefficients 
                                                 
32 I use the xtivreg procedure in STATA, using instruments are in the spirit of Black and Kniesner (2003), who propose 
using another mismeasured variable (i.e., state-level annual average prices) to clean out the measurement error in the 




on lagged prices were very small in magnitude and insignificant at the conventional 
levels. This is unsurprising if I recall that the “previous period” is usually two years prior 
to the current observations. I would expect people to react to changes in recent billing 
periods, and billing periods are usually one month (see Reiss and White, 2008).   
 In columns (F) and (G) of tables 3.8 and 3.9, I report regression results for the 
subsamples with electric heat and gas heat. I report only the results for the models with 
city-specific effects for the sake of brevity, but the same qualitative results hold for the 
models with dwelling- and dwelling-households effects (although the magnitude of the 
coefficients is slightly smaller). In contrast to earlier literature (Metcalf and Hassett, 
1999; Reiss and White, 2005), I find households with electric heating systems are 
actually less responsive to the price of electricity than households that use gas heat. 
Households with gas heat are slightly more sensitive to the price of gas than households 
that use electric heat.  
 However, Wald tests of the null that the elasticities are the same across the two 
groups fail to reject the null. For example, if attention is restricted to the equations in 
columns (F) and (G) of table 3.8, the Wald statistic of the null of identical own price 
elasticities is only 1.13 (p-value 0.29).  
The Wald statistics are even smaller in runs with fixed dwelling (or dwelling-
household) effects. One possible explanation for this is that the sample size is rather 
uneven across the groups of homes served with electric and gas heat. The number of 
observations with electric heat is 23,542, but drops to 8,416 when only true “panels” are 
used. This is only about 8% of the total sample. The resulting increase in variance may 




 Finally, I estimated models where I allow the responsiveness to energy prices to 
vary with the quartile of the income distribution that the household falls in. I find that the 
responsiveness to prices is a bit higher in the first quartile, and declines monotonically by 
quartile. For example, the elasticity of electricity consumption with respect to electricity 
price is -0.681 among households in the first income quartile, -0.673 among those in the 
second quartile, -0.663 among those in the third, and -0.645 among those in the fourth. 
An F test of the null that these elasticities are all identical rejects the null at the 1% level 
or better (F statistic=15.96, p-value less than 0.0001). Though statistically different, these 
elasticity estimates are close in value. 
G. Dynamic Models and Models with Investments 
 Turning to the partial adjustment model, I report results based on the Blundell-
Bond estimation procedure in table 3.10. Column (A) shows that the short-run own price 
elasticity of electricity consumption is -0.736, and the long-run one is -0.814, while the 
short-run cross-price elasticity (with respect to gas) is 0.265, and the long-run one is 
0.293. For gas consumption, shown in column (C), the short-run own price elasticity is -
0.572 and the long-run one is -0.647. The price of electricity is not significant in the gas 
equations. These equations include controls for the heating and cooling system, and I 
interpret them to imply adjustment when the current heating and cooling technology is 





Table 3.10 Blundell-Bond estimates of dynamic models 
  Log of energy usage - lkWh Log of energy usage - lMCF 
  (A) dwelling 
effect 
(B) no HVAC 
(C) dwelling 
effect 
(D) no HVAC 
Lag Consumption 
0.0958*** 0.0939*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 
6.09 5.83 6.2 6.41 
Log electric price 
-0.736*** -0.743*** -0.0716 -0.0821 
-12.26 -12.29 -0.91 -1.05 
Log gas price 
0.265*** 0.283*** -0.572*** -0.586*** 
5.15 5.56 -9.15 -9.32 
Log sq. ft 
0.142** 0.142** 0.14 0.137 
2.64 2.65 1.91 1.83 
Age of the home 
-0.00624* -0.00699* 0.00691* 0.00720* 
-2.04 -2.22 2.22 2.31 
Age of the home^2  
0.0000497 0.0000522 -0.0000353 -0.0000365 
1.63 1.68 -1.07 -1.11 
Owns the Home 
-0.0261 -0.031 -0.0168 -0.0101 
-0.90 -1.06 -0.45 -0.27 
N. of Rooms 
0.0128*** 0.0126*** 0.0162*** 0.0162*** 
3.7 3.6 3.72 3.7 
N. of Floors 
0.00976 -0.00316 0.149*** 0.164*** 
0.45 -0.14 4.98 5.4 
Log Hhold Income 
0.00935** 0.00925** 0.00318 0.00425 
3.09 3.05 0.93 1.23 
Young child dummy  
0.0725*** 0.0714*** 0.0574** 0.0578** 
4.89 4.8 3.01 2.99 
Elderly dummy  
-0.00728 -0.00829 0.016 0.019 
-0.36 -0.41 0.69 0.81 
Log CDD 
0.0660** 0.0793*** -0.0297 -0.0304 
3.01 3.56 -1.21 -1.22 
Log HDD 
0.0222 0.00478 0.200*** 0.202*** 
0.95 0.21 5.46 5.41 
Constant 
2.389*** 2.422*** -0.661 -0.844 
4.06 4.08 -0.91 -1.14 
N. of cases 24487 24487 17679 17679 
Long term elasticity -0.814 -0.82 -0.6471 -0.6682 
Notes: (1) T-stats reported; (2) significance level * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
In specifications (B) and (D) for electricity and gas, respectively, I exclude 




apply when the choice of heating and cooling technology is reversible. It has been argued 
that durable goods and heating and cooling equipment are variable in the long-run, hence 
these specifications should allow for greater response with respect to energy prices. In 
fact, I do find slightly elevated price elasticities, but the differences are minor, on the 
order of 1% for electricity regressions, and 3% for gas regressions.  
H. Conclusions 
In their Annual Energy Outlook, the Energy Information Agency historically 
employed a short-term price elasticity of -0.15 for residential demand for energy. In their 
2010 report, they adopt an electric elasticity of -0.30 in anticipation of improved 
consumer awareness resulting from recent smart grid projects.33 These projections 
highlight the drivers of demand for energy while underscoring the growing need for 
energy efficiency. Earlier reports commissioned by the DOE have summarized the 
potential role of energy efficiency in the residential sector (e.g., Granade et al., 2009). 
The price of energy, and various policy options that affect price, are usually considered to 
be the most direct means to affect energy consumption, promote conservation behavior, 
and incentivize energy efficiency. Yet investigators have found a very wide range of 
consumer response to energy price, with estimates ranging from the inelastic to the highly 
elastic depending on the time frame, location, aggregation level, as well as on the 
estimation methodology. This makes energy policy design a difficult challenge.  
To address these limitations of external validity, I assembled a panel dataset of 
households in the 50 largest metropolitan areas in the United States, maintaining 
                                                 
33 The text refers specifically to smart grid projects funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 




individual household and dwelling characteristics. By controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the household, dwelling, city, and state levels, I examine the relationship 
between estimates across different specifications using the same data. By using a panel of 
recent data, I observe dynamic energy usage behavior while accounting for changes in the 
household or dwelling.  
I find strong household response to energy prices, both in the short and long term, 
controlling for heating and cooling equipment and home appliances. These results stand 
in marked contrast to much of the literature on residential energy consumption in the 
United States, and suggest a more central role for policies which affect energy price than 





Chapter 4: The Role of Planned Tenure in Energy Efficiency 
Investments  
Researchers have proposed many explanations for low levels of observed 
investment in residential energy efficiency. Planned tenure within the home has not been 
one of them. Armed with data of unprecedented scope and duration, in this chapter I 
examine the relationship between staying/moving and residential investment in energy 
efficiency. I ask three questions: First, what are the determinants of household investment 
in energy efficiency? Second, what is the relationship between planned tenure in the 
home and energy efficiency investment? And, third, does the effect of tenure vary by 
investment type?  
 My contribution is to provide the first empirical estimate of the effect of planned 
tenure on residential energy efficiency investment. The analysis is possible because of the 
unprecedented scope and detail of data on the economic decisions of households. This 
allows me to study the role of house and household characteristics, weather, and energy 
price on different types of household investments. I also explore the effect of the age of 
the householder and their education level on investment decisions, an area where 
previous literature has found mixed results.  
The econometric analysis is complicated for four reasons. First, I assume energy 
efficiency investments depend on whether the household plans to stay in the home, but 
the likelihood of staying or moving is not asked of respondents or reported in the AHS. 
Second, the planned tenure decision is endogenous with the investment decision. Third, 




the household is still living in the home at time t. Finally, outcomes and key variables 
such as investment and moving are binary instead of continuous.  
Briefly, I find that many of the determinants of energy efficiency investment in 
the home are the same as the determinants of the demand for energy: larger and older 
dwellings use more energy, and are more likely to require replacements of equipment. On 
the role of planned tenure within the home, I find that energy efficiency investments are 
20% less likely for households that will move in the next period, but that moving has no 
effect on the non-energy related home improvements.  
These results suggest that homeowners do not believe that energy efficiency is 
capitalized into the value of their home. This gives those who are unsure as to whether 
they will stay in the home for the length of time necessary to payback an energy 
efficiency investment (5 years or more) a disincentive to invest in energy efficiency. 
Policies that seek to encourage investment in energy efficient appliances may gain 
broader appeal by attracting planned movers. To provide an incentive for movers to 
invest, efficiency must be capitalized into home values, which suggests that energy 
performance needs to be observable to home buyers. Government-mandated auditing or 
energy certification may help mitigate this problem. 
A. American Housing Survey Data 
Earlier research on household investment was performed with cross-sections or 
extremely short panels of data (with a maximum of two observations per household as in 
Dubin and McFadden, 1984), restrictive geographical areas and investment categories 
(e.g., Revelt and Train, 1998), or on old data. I have assembled a large and 




household investment behavior from 1997 to 2009.34 The AHS contains extensive 
information about the structural characteristics of the dwelling, renovations and retrofits, 
home ownership and its financial aspects (mortgages, maintenance costs, etc.), appliances 
and heating/cooling systems, socio-demographic and economic circumstances of the 
occupants, and their assessment of the quality of the home and the neighborhood.  
 In this dataset (as compared to chapter 3), I add the 2009 wave of the AHS, but I 
exclude from my sample those reporting investments necessitated by disasters (e.g., fires, 
floods, etc.; N = 1841) and homes with nobody over the age of 18 (N = 418). Relative to 
the sample used in chapter 3, the addition of 2009 data increases the overall sample to 
111,825 observations from 90,880 dwellings and 100,337 households. However, for the 
investment models estimated here, all specifications consider the decision to invest and/or 
move in the future. Investment variables are constructed from observed household 
variables in the subsequent period (t+1), while independent variables are formed from 
characteristics observed in this period (t). As a consequence, the sample is restricted to 
households that appear in at least two periods (N = 42,019). Table 4.1 displays the 






                                                 
34 Quigley and Rubinfeld (19892001) used AHS to estimate their hedonic model of residential energy demand, but use 




Table 4.1 Sample observations by survey year 
1997 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2009 
Total Obs (N) 6,346 8,579 6,554 25,377 8,092 22,978 6,235 10,390 17,274 
(cross-section) 220 891 178 24,843 580 21,501 99 4,981 8,709 
(panel) 6,126 7,688 6,376 534 7,512 1,477 6,136 5,409 8,565 
Heater 284 438 346 1,184 405 1,517 306 653 854 
Water heater 483 694 520 2,395 643 2,381 500 995 1,427 
Flooring 298 1,542 1,108 4,668 1,455 5,526 1,286 2,226 2,375 
Fencing 413 486 428 2,043 489 2,224 429 767 1,103 
Heat-related 834 1,233 942 3,821 1,115 4,161 891 1,747 2,202 
(single) 186 205 158 474 181 543 162 275 327 
 
Table 4.2 Sample observations by longitudinal component 
Length of the Panel 
Dwellings Households Heater Investments 
N N N Rate 
1 17,448 24,233 611 2.50% 
2 12,385 12,559 366 2.90% 
3 8,055 6,635 231 3.50% 
4 6,534 4,458 164 3.70% 
5 4,773 2,889 111 3.80% 
6 2,843 1,668 42 2.50% 
7 1,161 757 - 
Total (Panel) 53,199   
Unique (Dwelling) 18,906   
Unique (Household) 25,361   
 
A.1 Investment Variables 
Economic theory dictates that investment should be influenced by expected 
benefits and discount rate (see e.g., Hausman, 1979). I estimate demand curves for 
different types energy efficiency investments / home renovations. Demand drivers 
include (i) dwelling characteristics associated with total energy usage, such as square 




(and proxies for cost) of the current stock of energy equipment; (iii) the upfront cost of 
replacement or renovation, proxied with labor costs for doing home renovation projects; 
and (iv) a home price index to proxy the state of the local housing market.  
The AHS reports home repairs and renovations in 76 distinct categories.35 For the 
choice of dependent variable, I choose heater and water heater investments to represent 
energy efficiency investments in the home. I also check the sensitivity of the results to 
non-energy “cosmetic” types of investment, such as flooring replacements or kitchen 
remodels. To distinguish between planned investments and required replacements, in 
alternative specifications I split the sample into observations with a single investment to 
proxy a breakage, and those with more than one simultaneous investment, arguing that 
simultaneous breakages are unlikely.36 Descriptive statistics for investment types are 
displayed in table 4.3.  
Table 4.3 Classification of investment types 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Heater Invest 49463 0.03 0.181 0 1 
Water heater Invest 49463 0.05 0.227 0 1 
Any heater Invest 49463 0.08 0.271 0 1 
Kitchen Invest 49463 0.03 0.180 0 1 
Flooring Invest 49463 0.11 0.315 0 1 
Fencing Invest 49463 0.04 0.203 0 1 
Move out 36957 0.20 0.399 0 1 
Log Electric Bill 105702 4.41 0.634 0.27 6.43 
Log Gas Bill 77743 4.14 0.697 0.98 6.36 
Log HDD 106,880 7.87 0.931 4.56 9.05 
HPI 106,880 168.71 46.532 100.53 337.80 
Wage Rate 106,880 13.52 3.008 5.80 23.66 
                                                 
35 For each investment, the total cost is recorded, along with a dummy variable indicating whether a household member 
did ‘most of’ the work 
 
36 The AHS does not include explicit questions about what prompted an investment, yet the motivation for a 
replacement, dictated by an unforeseen breakdown in equipment and a planned replacement or renovation, dictated by 




A.2 Household Characteristics 
 Dwelling and household characteristics for the AHS data were reported in chapter 
3. The addition of 2009-survey year data does not materially change the distribution of 
these variables. For comparison, while the average household income is slightly lower in 
real terms: $87,000 (2009$), the average household size is 2.8, 31% of the sample has 
small children, and 23% has at least one person aged 65 or older living in this house; 
nearly identical statistics to those reported in chapter 3.  
 Incentives to making durable investments in the home are different for owners 
and renters, and I include a “renter” dummy in the model.37 I expect the coefficient on 
this variable to be negative, since the time horizon over which to reap the investment 
capitalization are typically much shorter, and any capital investments made in the home 
by renters are forfeited to the owner or the subsequent tenants when the renter moves 
out.  
 Household characteristics are also important in explaining tenure and energy 
efficiency investment decisions. Income, the number and age of occupants, education 
level, and the number of employed household members are used. In the sample used in 
chapter 5, 26% of households report that the head of the household graduated from 
college (19% from high school), and there are an average of 1.3 workers per household. 
Neighborhood quality is also important in explaining planned tenure. A dummy variable 
indicating observed crime in the neighborhood (18% of households) and whether the 
household has a child in the local public school (25%) affect the decision to relocate, but 
not the decision to invest in energy efficiency directly, and so serve as identifying 
                                                 




instruments in the tenure model. House and household characteristics of the sample are 
reported in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child under 5 106,880 0.03 0.229 0 6 
Child 6 to 13 106,880 0.07 0.352 0 7 
No. Children 106,880 0.69 1.075 0 10 
No. Adults 106,880 2.04 0.869 1 10 
Youngest Age 106,880 32.29 25.269 0 101 
Oldest Age 106,880 52.04 15.886 19 101 
Elderly 106,880 0.23 0.420 0 1 
Log Income 106,880 10.82 1.618 -0.43 15.79 
High School 106,880 0.19 0.392 0 1 
Some College 106,880 0.31 0.462 0 1 
College Grad 106,880 0.26 0.437 0 1 
Post College 106,880 0.17 0.375 0 1 
Home Rating 106,135 8.06 1.733 1 10 
Public School 106,880 0.25 0.431 0 1 
No. Workers 106,880 1.28 0.955 0 9 
 
B. Model and Estimation 
 In this section I present a basic model of investment in energy efficiency 
renovations and appliances. Policies aimed at residential energy efficiency seek to reduce 
the structural energy demand in the housing sector by encouraging investment in more 
efficient appliances and equipment. Each appliance offers a bundle of attributes between 
which a household must choose: energy efficiency, purchase price, operating and 
maintenance costs, and aesthetic characteristics. In this section, I focus on the efficiency-
cost tradeoff: the decision between upfront purchase price and long-term running costs.  
I posit that a household maximizes the utility from an equipment investment 
subject to their budget constraint. The household derives utility from the service, S, 




consumption of the non-energy composite commodity X. Consider a two-period model in 
which the consumer can invest in efficiency, I, which is a substitute for energy 
consumption, E, in period 2. Formally, 
max
, ,
, , ,  
s.t.   (4.1) 
where for simplicity it is assumed that the price of energy is constant over the two 
periods. The Lagrangian of the household problem is: 
, , ,  (4.2) 
I assume a concave utility function and energy usage decreasing in energy efficiency 
investment, holding E constant. The first order conditions with respect to energy and 
investment result in a standard tradeoff between present and discounted future 
consumption, as well as between expenditure on energy and investment:  
  (4.3) 
		 	   (4.4) 
The equality of marginal productivity condition (equation 4.3) ensures that 
marginal energy savings and investment per unit price are equalized in period 2. The no-
arbitrage condition (equation 4.4) indicates that (if the energy price is constant) the 
household will equalize the marginal utility of energy demand in period 1 and the 
discounted energy demand in period 2. Essentially, the household trades consumption in 
period 1 for energy savings in period 2. The optimal demand functions for investment in 





∗ ∗ , , ,      (4.5) 
I make three claims from this simple model. First, the investment in efficiency 
should be increasing in energy price: the benefits of efficiency grow as potential savings 
accumulate. Second, investment is decreasing in the rate of intertemporal preference: The 
more patient the household, the more they are willing to invest in energy efficiency, other 
things being equal. I proxy the discount factor with planned time horizon within the 
home, and I explicitly focus on both time horizon and energy price in my econometric 
specifications.  
B.1 Model Selection 
 I wish to estimate the following model:  
	                     (4.6) 
where  is a dummy variable for investment type k in period t by household i, and x is 
a vector of dwelling and household characteristics, energy prices, and weather.  is a 
dummy denoting whether the household plans to stay at the present home in the next 
period:  
     (4.7) 
where  is a vector of dwelling and household characteristics that influence desire to 
relocate (e.g., income, presence of children, housing market conditions, the age of the 
home), duration (the accumulated years within the dwelling at the start of the sample), 
and neighborhood characteristics that have no direct bearing on investment (e.g., the 
reported presence of crime, neighborhood school quality and heavy traffic).  
The estimation of model 4.6 is complicated for three reasons: (i) the simultaneity 




as an omitted variable bias due to the missing selection term explaining the presence in 
the sample), and (iii) both the dependent variable and the selection variable are binary.  
 I use two alternative strategies to estimate the effect of tenure on the investment 
decision: (i) a bivariate probit model of the joint decisions for planned tenure and 
investment (Evans and Schwab, 1995), adjusted by inverse probability weighting to 
account for attrition (Wooldridge, 2010), or (ii) an attrition-adjusted 2SLS model 
(Angrist, 2001). My dataset does not contain a variable on planned house tenure, 
therefore I estimate a model of moving and use the predicted probability of being in the 
home, , in lieu of  in (3.6). I control for unobserved heterogeneity by using 
year controls and by clustering standard errors at the household level. These adjustments 
are discussed in detail below.  
B.2 Econometric Issues 
The model (eqs 4.6 and 4.7) can be rewritten as: 
∗              (4.8) 
				 1												if       ∗ 0                          
			 0           otherwise.    
where the tenure decision, S, is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 when at time 
(t-1) the household chooses to stay in the home at time t, and is otherwise missing. In 
particular, households make an endogenous selection choice that influences investment: 
whether to stay in the home. If the household decides to move before the next period 
(S=0), I do not observe whether they have made an investment in this or any subsequent 




in the home, and to handle observations differently depending on their spell in the 
sample. 
With panel data, selection out of the sample is typically an absorbing state: all 
subsequent observations for that unit are lost. This is true of my data: households 
generally move out for good. An additional challenge is posed by the fact that my 
dependent variable is binary: commonly, attrition is handled by using a two-stage 
instrumental variables approach, and possibly differencing the equation to remove 
unobserved effects (Wooldridge, 2010), but these approaches are undesirable with a 
binary dependent variable. 
In general, a linear panel data model is specified as:  
		for			 1,⋯ , 	 and 1,⋯ ,    (4.9) 
Under strict exogeneity, ( |	 0,	for , 1,⋯ ,  serial independence of the 
errors, and no unobserved heterogeneity, equation 5.9 can be estimated consistently with 
OLS. Of course, with panel data it is possible to correct for unobserved heterogeneity. If 
the heterogeneity is time-constant,  and ( |	 , 0 , 1,⋯ ,  
), it is desirable to use the “within” estimator. However, I have an unbalanced panel, and 
if attrition is non-random, the idiosyncratic error term is potentially correlated with x: 
|	 0  and the estimates are inconsistent.  
Heckman’s (1978) two-stage instrumental variables approach can be used to 
address sample selection and attrition (Wooldridge, 2010), yet there is limited application 
of this approach to data with a longitudinal component and unobserved heterogeneity.38 
                                                 
38 The literature on treatment for selection bias is quite extensive; unfortunately, most applications relate to the cross-
sectional case. Recent attention has been devoted to panel data (see, e.g. Semykina and Wooldridge 2010), but studies 





In the setting of this chapter, the estimation challenge is how to consistently estimate the 
effect of planned tenure (a binary selection variable) on the likelihood of investment 
(binary dependent variable) over time. 
B.3 Estimation Methodology 
In a seminal paper on schooling and self-selection, Evans and Schwab (1995) 
utilize both a bivariate probit model and 2SLS to estimate a binary treatment effect 
(Catholic high school enrollment) with a binary outcome (enrolling in college). I follow a 
similar approach here. In the second stage of my 2SLS approach, I estimate: 
	                                        (4.10) 
where  captures the effect of tenure on efficiency investment, and 	is predicted from a 
first stage regression of moving on a vector of instruments. Consistent estimation of  
requires that the instruments be correlated with the moving decision, but be exogenous to 
the investment equation, , 	0, and at least one variable of  does not 
appear in . 
Alternatively, assuming that the errors in the investment and selection equation 
are jointly normally distributed: , ~ 0, Ω , where Ω
1
1 , one can 
estimate a bivariate probit model. The first step is to construct the probability of 
investment conditional on selection (see Wooldridge, 2010, p. 595):  
1|	 1, Φ / 1 /          (4.11)           
                                                                                                                                                 





where ,  is the off-diagonal term of the covariance matrix Ω. Estimation is 
by maximum likelihood. The effect of moving on investment is thus | 1
| 0 , and is estimated using the predicted probabilities post-estimation: |∆
|	 1 |	 0 .  
Regardless of the estimation procedure, attrition is a concern. I follow 
Wooldridge (2010) in adjusting for attrition by using inverse probability weights (IPW), 
i.e. the reciprocals of predicted probabilities from a selection equation. I adjust all 
specifications with IPW formed from the initial values for each household, an approach 
used by Contoyannis et al. (2004).39  
B.4 Statistical Tests and Robustness Checks 
The appropriate estimation methodology in a model of binary selection is a matter 
of debate. Angrist (2001) notes that average effects estimated using 2SLS, which do not 
rely on distributional assumptions, are often similar to estimates from models that impose 
more assumptions and structure (e.g., IV tobit, bivariate probit). Altonji et al. (2005) note 
the estimated average effect in a bivariate probit model often rests crucially on the 
nonlinearity rather than the exclusion restriction. Yet binary events may not be well 
approximated by a linear probability model, resulting in imprecise estimates from the 
2SLS, a point made in Carrasco (2001) and elsewhere. In sum, both procedures have 
merits and disadvantages.  
                                                 
39 This approach relies on the existence of good instruments to model selection, such that, conditional on those 
instruments, attrition is exogenous. This is termed the ‘selection on observables’ condition. In my specifications, I use a 
vector of initial household characteristics (t=0) related to move propensity, such as income, age, and neighborhood 
rating, to proxy selection, as reported in table A1. The selection equation is a probit for the biprobit estimation, and an 




I investigate the robustness of the estimated coefficients in several ways. First, by 
running two distinct models, the LPM-based 2SLS model, and a bivariate probit, I check 
the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions implicit in either. I also repeat the 
estimation of the models for different subsamples created according to (i) the number of 
periods each household appears, (ii) the number of periods each dwelling appears, (iii) 
for successive 2-year balanced intervals of my data. These results are shown in the 
appendix B, Table AB.1).  
I test for attrition in two ways: by including for each household (i) the number of 
periods they appear in the sample, and (ii) a dummy variable indicating whether they are 
present for all periods in the sample. If attrition is not a concern, the coefficients on these 
additional regressors should be statistically indistinguishable from zero (Contoyannis et 
al., 2004). 
C. Results 
C.1 Reduced Form  
My model differs from the previous literature on energy efficiency investment, so 
I first wish to compare my estimates for the determinants of investment with the findings 
of earlier studies. I estimate a series of models similar to (5.6) but without relocation 
variables (table 4.5). Heater investment is chosen as the dependent variable because it 
accounts for the largest share of residential energy consumption (41%, EIA 2005), is one 
of the most common home energy efficiency investments, and is studied frequently in the 





Table 4.5 Reduced form results 
Dependent Heater Investments 
Model LPM LPM RE 
Sample All Homeowners Homeowners 
  (A) (B) (C)  
Renter -0.0270*** 
Log Electric Bill 0.00178 
Log Gas Bill 0.00608** 
Log Electric Price -0.0076 -0.0093 
Log Gas Price -0.00255 -0.00143 
Log Income 0.000627 0.000959 0.000773 
No. Children 0.00183 0.00211 0.00183 
No. Adults 0.0000969 0.000115 -0.000209 
Elderly  -0.00265 -0.00277 -0.00364 
Youngest Age 0.000107 0.000132* 0.000146 
College Grad 0.0116*** 0.0150*** 0.0146** 
Post College 0.0119*** 0.0151*** 0.0167*** 
Log HDD 0.00565*** 0.00683*** 0.00624** 
Wage Rate -0.0000967 -0.000284 -0.00159** 
HPI -0.0000659* -0.0000728* -0.0000664 
Log Sq. Ft 0.000511 0.000492 0.00066 
Home Age 20+ 0.0379*** 0.0419*** 0.0436*** 
Rooms 0.00283*** 0.00315*** 0.00332*** 
A/C Dummy -0.00288 -0.00494 -0.00642* 
Constant -0.0672** -0.0903** -0.0884*** 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0208 0.0179 
N. of cases 47258 40023 32092 
N. groups 12292 
Notes: significance level * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
All specifications in table 4.5 control for household education level, fuel type, the 
age of the home, sample year, and the number of adults in the household, and use 
standard errors clustered around the household.40 Model (A) demonstrates, as expected, 
                                                 





that renters are significantly less likely to make investments; all remaining models in 
table 4.5 exclude renters entirely.  
The results of table 4.5 mirror earlier findings on household energy efficiency 
investment: investments are more likely in older, larger homes, or bigger, richer 
households. In particular, the age of the home is significant in every specification. This 
result suggests that new heater investments are 5 percentage points more likely in homes 
built 20 or more years earlier, other things equal. The size of the home (log square feet, 
number of rooms) is also positively associated with investment. Elderly, a dummy 
variable indicating that a household member is over 65 years old, is insignificant for all 
specifications. Youngest Age, a variable reporting the age of the youngest member of the 
household, has a positive (and significant in column B) coefficient, suggesting young 
families are slightly more likely to invest. Those with more modest demands for heat 
(such as older residents, those with fewer children, or those that live in more moderate 
climates) are less likely to invest in a heater.41  
Education is positively associated with heater investment. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable associated with the head of the household being a college graduate 
(College Grad) or having an advanced degree (Post College) are both highly significant 
with large positive coefficients, suggesting that educated households are more than 10 
percentage points more likely to invest in heating than households whose members did 
not attend college. On comparing columns (B) and (C) in table 4.5, I conclude that 
                                                 
41 The presence of an air conditioner is negatively associated with heater investment. This may be due to households 
reporting heat pumps, devices that both heat and cool, as air conditioners. I am unable to explore this further, as the 





average monthly electricity and gas expenditures are a better predictor of heater 
investments than energy prices.42  
C.2 The Tenure Decision 
What is the effect of planned tenure on investment? In table 4.6, I present the 
results of a series of 2SLS regressions of heater investment on house and household 
specific characteristics, instrumenting for the decision to move. The results of the first 
stage (equation 4.7) instrumenting equation are reported in column (C). Table 4.7 (model 
A) presents the results of a bivariate probit model jointly estimating heating investment 
and relocation (the planned tenure model estimates appear in column (B) of table 4.7). 
All investment specifications include age of the home, heating type, ages of the 
household members, and number of children.43  
 
  
                                                 
42 Model (6c) gives identical estimates for all coefficients when estimated by OLS instead of GLS: nearly all variation 
comes from between rather than within households. 
 
43 While the 2SLS employs a Linear Probability Model (table 7), the bivariate probit assumes that the latent variables 
are normally distributed (table 8). Thus, the coefficients of the bivariate probit model are not directly comparable to the 




Table 4.6 2SLS heater investments 
Dependent Heater Heater Move 
Model IV 2SLS IV 2SLS LPM 
(A) (B) (C) 
Move Out -0.223* -0.217* 
Log Electric Bill 0.00300 0.00274 0.00073 
Log Gas Bill 0.00617* 0.00649* -0.00606 
Log Income 0.000432 0.000440 -0.00182 
No. Children 0.00257 0.00272 0.00478 
No. Adults -0.00300 -0.00276 -0.0111*** 
Elderly -0.00603 -0.00600 -0.0164* 
Youngest Age 0.000209 0.000214 0.00296 
No. Workers 0.00195 0.00227 0.00012 
College Grad 0.0176** 0.0175** -0.00366 
Post College 0.0194** 0.0190** -0.00947 
Log HDD 0.0102*** 0.0103*** 0.00122 
Wage Rate -0.00251*** -0.00237** -0.00044 
HPI -0.0000905 -0.0000912 -0.00003 
Log Sq. Ft. 0.00235 0.00237 0.0133*** 
Home Age 20+ 0.0541*** 0.0528*** 0.0299** 
No. Rooms 0.00342** 0.00336** -0.00189 
No. Floors -0.00502* -0.00531* -0.0077** 
A/C Dummy -0.00974* -0.00932* -0.00082 
All Periods 0.0393 0.0381 0.244*** 
Household Panel -0.0212 -0.0203 -0.127*** 
Gone Next 0.0334* 0.00184 
Child 6 to 13 0.00482 
Oldest Age 0.00102 
Home Rating -0.00573*** 
Crime Dummy 0.00743 
Public School -0.00668 
Constant -0.0196 -0.0255 0.528*** 
R-squared 0.2888 
N. of cases 23762 23645 23645 
Weights No Yes Yes 






Table 4.7 Bivariate probit heater investments 
Dependent Heater Move 
Model Bivariate Probit 
  (A) (B) 
Move Out -5.814*** 
Log Electric Bill 0.0287 
Log Gas Bill 0.0722* 
Log Income 0.00877 -0.0225*** 
No. Children 0.0222 -0.00188 
No. Adults -0.0195 -0.0884*** 
Elderly  -0.0599 
Youngest Age 0.00148 -0.000426 
No. Workers 0.0149 -0.0357* 
College Grad 0.194** 
Post College 0.211** 
Log HDD 0.111*** 
Wage Rate -0.0227** 
HPI -0.000807 -0.00149*** 
Log Sq. Ft. 0.00274 
Home Age 20+ 0.694*** 
No. Rooms 0.0325*** 
No. Floors -0.0444* 
A/C Dummy -0.0889* 
Household Panel -0.00519 
All Periods 0.00404 
Gone Next 0.344** 
Child 6 to 13 0.0528 
Oldest Age -0.00814*** 
Home Rating  -0.0404*** 
Crime Dummy 0.00533 
Public School -0.142*** 
Constant -3.508*** 0.484*** 
rho 0.041 - 
N. of cases 23645 - 
Weights Yes - 
Notes: significance level * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Focusing on specifications (A) and (B) in table 4.6, the predicted probability of 
moving in the next period, Move Out, has a negative coefficient implying a 20% effect. 




in the home, which has important policy implications. The other coefficients in 
specifications (A) and (B) are similar to those in table 4.5.  
The first stage regression, predicting the likelihood of moving in the subsequent 
period, is reported in Model (C) in table 4.6. Although income is positively correlated 
with investment, it is negatively correlated with moving in general. Likewise, the 
presence of children in the household increases the likelihood of investing, but decreases 
the likelihood of moving. The likelihood of moving is negatively related to the number of 
adults in the home and the presence of elderly. The age of the home has significantly 
positive impacts on the probability of moving, but also on the probability of investing, 
while the size of the home (square feet, number of floors) positively impacts moving but 
has no direct effect on investment.  
Other instruments are significant predictors of the moving decision: the higher the 
home rating, the less likely the probability of moving. Interestingly, neither the existence 
of school-aged children in the home, Child 6 to 13, nor the attendance of children in the 
local school significantly affects the move probability. Model (B) in table 4.7, the 
bivariate estimate for the probability of moving, reflects the correlations noted here, but 
the level of significance differs because the included variables and the estimation 
technique are different. Importantly, it confirms that the effect of moving on investment 
is negative and significant. 
C.3 Other Investment Types 
In table 4.8, I examine the effect of planned tenure on other types of investments, 
such as Water Heater (column A), Any heater – an aggregate of both heater and water 




heater is the only investment made (C), kitchen renovation (D), and replacement of 
interior flooring or carpeting (E), or exterior fencing (column F).  







Kitchen Flooring Fencing 
Model IV 2SLS 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Move Out -0.196** -0.234** -0.0775* 0.0486 0.108 0.0967 
Log Electric 
Bill 
0.00194 0.00283 0.00345 -0.00177 0.00111 -0.00299 
Log Gas Bill 0.00751 0.0122* 0.000193 0.00345 0.0048 0.00287 
Log Income 0.00116 0.00162 0.000638 0.00303** 0.00503** 0.00154 
No. Children 0.00243 0.00409 0.000841 0.00187 0.0043 -0.00059 
No. Adults -0.00645 -0.00606 -0.00251 0.00369 0.00825 0.000773 
Elderly  -0.00479 -0.011 0.000863 -0.00426 -0.0118 -0.0130* 
Youngest Age -0.000174 0.00006 0.000127 -0.000246* -0.000615** -0.000297* 
No. Workers 0.00581* 0.00635* 0.00132 0.00157 0.0113** 0.0014 
College Grad 0.00764 0.0257** 0.000539 0.00665 0.00886 0.0250*** 
Post College 0.00791 0.0294** -0.00146 0.0150* 0.0014 0.0222** 
Log HDD -0.00663 -0.0202 0.00234 -0.0164 -0.0105 0.0144 
Log Sq. Ft. -0.000057 0.000264 -0.000878 0.000327 -0.00322 -0.000426 
Wage Rate -0.00303 -0.00216 -0.00107 0.0000412 -0.00630* -0.00506** 
HPI -0.0000362 -0.0000844 -0.0000689 0.0000638 -0.000367** 0.000029 
Home Age 
20+ 
0.0601*** 0.0988*** 0.0140*** 0.0522*** 0.0736*** 0.0434*** 
No. Rooms 0.000493 0.00389* -0.00147 0.00128 0.00557** 0.00415*** 
No. Floors -0.000219 -0.00472 -0.00161 -0.00145 -0.00537 -0.00197 
Constant 0.101 0.0268 -0.0604 0.0141 0.259 -0.118 
R-squared 0.0148 0.033 . . . . 
N. of cases 22263 22263 22263 22263 22263 22263 
Notes: significance level * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
In column (A) of table 4.8, water heater renovation is regressed against the vector 
of house and household characteristics, including the same controls as in table 4.6. The 
age of the home is significant with a positive coefficient, while the number of workers in 
the home, No. Workers, has a positive effect, significant at the 5% level. Older homes are 




investment. The other coefficients in model (table 5.4, column A) generally have the 
same sign as in table 4.6. The effect of planned tenure on water heater investment is 
negative and implies a 20% decrease in the likelihood of investment. This estimate is 
significant at the 1% level. 
Model (4.8B) displays the results of the 2SLS regression for Any Heater 
investment. Again, the coefficients are similar to those found in table 4.6 and (4.8A), 
with the expenditures on natural gas, education level, home age, number of workers, and 
number of rooms all having positive and significant coefficients. The coefficient on Move 
Out is again very strong: a predicted probability of moving in the next period is seen to 
decrease the probability of investment by nearly 23%, significant at the 1% level.  
Model (4.8C) considers only single renovations, which may be indicative of a 
breakdown (and a necessary replacement) rather than a planned investment. As might be 
expected with a sudden event, and replacement of broken equipment, none of the 
household characteristics are significant. The significant covariates simply reflect the 
probability of a breakdown: The home age variable, which proxies the age of the 
equipment, is positively associated with a single heater replacement, but the effect is 
smaller than in previous models. The No. Rooms coefficient takes the opposite sign of 
specification (4.8A) and (4.8B), and a smaller magnitude.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on planned tenure, Move Out, is negatively 
associated with replacement: those predicted to move in the next period are nearly 10 
percentage points less likely to replace a heater than those who are not. This result 
suggests that the construction of the dependent variable may not perfectly distinguish 




Models (4.8D), (4.8E), and (4.8F) show the results of the kitchen, flooring, and 
fencing investments, respectively. The drivers of investment here are similar to those 
discussed above, with several exceptions that underscore the differing nature of these 
“functional” investments as compared with energy efficiency investments. First, income 
is positively and significantly associated with flooring and kitchen investments, and its 
coefficient is several times larger than the estimates in previous regressions. Second, the 
presence of elderly and very young children reduces the likelihood of these investments. 
Notably, for all “cosmetic” specifications, the coefficients on move are positive, although 
not significant. This suggests that homeowners may expect to reap the additional value of 
such an investment upon home sale, and therefore, a planned move does not decrease 
(and may even increase) the likelihood of such an investment.  
The central question of this chapter is the relationship between tenure and energy 
efficiency investment. As discussed in section 3, the estimation of an endogenous binary 
selection variable in a binary model is not econometrically straightforward. Table 4.9 
reports the effect of moving on Any Heater investments using different estimation 
methodologies: Model (4.9A) displays the results of an unweighted IV 2SLS approach, 
(4.9B) includes inverse probability weights to control for attrition, and (4.9C) presents 
the results of a bivariate probit estimation of any heater investment and a planned move. 
The marginal effect of moving, evaluated at the means of all variables, is presented with 
bootstrapped standard errors. While the addition of IPW does not substantially change the 
estimate for the effect of moving, the marginal effect evaluated at the mean is a 21% 
decrease in investment likelihood versus 23% for the 2SLS approach. The slight 




assumptions in the bivariate probit model, or due the poor approximation of binary 
process with the 2SLS. Despite differences in the magnitude of the effects, these findings 
are in line with Evans and Schwab (1995) and Altonji et al. (2005). Both approaches 
agree in that homeowners refrain from making efficiency investments if they plan on 
moving.  
Table 4.9 Model comparison 
Dependent Any Heater (Heater or Water Heater Investments) 
Model LPM LPM Bivariate Probit 
Methodology 2SLS 2SLS MLE 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Inv Prob Weights No Yes Yes 
(A) (B) (C) 
Move Out -0.235** -0.234** -6.737*** 
SE (0.082) (0.079) (0.164) 
marginal effect -0.215*** 
bootstrapped SE - - (0.0155) 
observations 23863 23863 23722 
Notes: (standard errors in parentheses)    significance level * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
C.4 Robustness Checks  
The variables included to test for attrition, the number of periods they appear in 
the sample (Household Panel) and a dummy variable indicating whether they are present 
in all periods (All Periods) are not significant when included (models 4.6A, 4.6B, 4.7A), 
suggesting that attrition does not greatly impact the estimates in my models. The 
similarity of the coefficient of interest (Move Out) from the different models (Table 4.9) 
is further evidence of the robustness of the results.  
To further check robustness, I investigate Any Heater investments (model 4.8C) 




(ii) according to the number of periods each dwelling appears, (iii) for successive 2-year 
balanced intervals of my data. These results show little variation between models. 17 out 
of 19 specifications result in negative coefficients on Move Out (the two positive 
coefficients are not significant), and the results are robust to inclusion of the attrition test 
variables. Selected models are shown in appendix B (Table AB.1). Finally, I estimate 
2SLS models for alternate dependent variables. The results are consistent with Table 9: 
the effect of moving is negative on energy–related investments. Although none of the 
coefficients are significant, the magnitude is greater for energy-related investments that 
are not directly observable, such as roof renovation, than for non-energy related ones 
(Table AB.2). 
D. Conclusions  
 Residential energy efficiency investments are regarded as key to unlocking low-
carbon economic growth and improved air quality in the U.S (IPCC, 2007, Granade et 
al., 2009). If homeowners can be persuaded to install more efficient heating/cooling 
equipment and electrical appliances, the reduction in energy usage will last for decades. 
Existing policies promoting residential energy efficiency mail fail to account for the 
relationship between planned tenure and investment. I have used comprehensive data on 
U.S. households from 1997-2009 and an IV approach, and I find that planned moving out 
of a home decreases the likelihood of investing in heating equipment by 20%. In 
contrast, planned moving has no or a positive effect on investments that are unrelated to 
energy efficiency but may enhance the value of the home aesthetically, such as flooring, 




 Where energy usage is concerned, the relationship between potential homebuyers 
and home sellers suffers from information asymmetry: the seller has an incentive to 
overstate the (unobserved) energy efficiency. Lacking proof, efficiency claims by the 
seller are disregarded, and the energy efficiency of the home is not captured in the sales 
price. Accordingly, homeowners that plan on selling their home before they have reaped 
the benefits of an energy efficiency investment will resist paying the efficiency premium. 
This ongoing underinvestment in energy efficiency results in a low-efficiency building 
stock.  
The information asymmetry has other important policy implications. In the U.S., 
approximately 14% of homeowners move within a two-year period, and approximately 
10% of all homes will replace their heaters in that window. This is equivalent to a 
population of 1,050,000 homeowners that will move and will also need to replace their 
heaters.44  
The efficiency rating of heaters can vary by up to 30% or more. Comparing just 
the top of the efficiency distribution, the difference between the ‘mid-efficiency’ and the 
‘high-efficiency’ heater is approximately 10 Annual Fuel Utilization Efficiency (AFUE). 
At the average heat consumption (40MBtu per year45), over a heater lifetime of 20 years, 
the resulting difference in energy usage for a single household is 80 MBTU, or 4.25 
metric tons CO2 if burning natural gas.
46 Scaling to the entire population of moving 
households, and adjusting by the reduction of 20% in the likelihood of efficiency 
                                                 
44 Assuming a heater lifetime of 20 years. 
45 EIA latest available, http://www.eia.gov/consumption/residential/data/2005/c&e/spaceheating/pdf/tablesh8.pdf 




investment, there are approximately 900,000 metric tons of CO2 emitted annually in the 
U.S. as a result of this market failure.47 
 The information failure in the market for energy efficiency highlights an 
important opportunity for governmental involvement. Certain policy measures are 
already in place: subsidies for efficient equipment enhance adoption by artificially 
lowering the cost of equipment, and appliance standards increase the minimum efficiency 
of available equipment. A rental market in efficient equipment48 could also boost 
efficiency, but high transaction costs temper that opportunity. A more direct policy 
solution would be to solve the information problem: require standardized energy 
performance data or certification as part of home sales and rental transactions, and 
improve energy efficiency of the residential sector. 
  
                                                 
47 Moving percentages, average HDD taken from the AHS sample; 65.9% of the 114,596,927 occupied housing units in 
the U.S. are owner-occupied (Census, 2010): 75.5 Million homes. (http://factfinder2.census.gov); Heater statistics 
relate to furnaces and boilers ratings listed at: 
http://www.energysavers.gov/your_home/space_heating_cooling/index.cfm/mytopic=12530. AFUE is a measure of 
operational efficiency applied to furnaces and boilers according to ASHRAE standard 103. 
48 Energy performance contracts, common to institutional settings such as hospitals, schools, and government buildings, 
allow an energy service company “ESCO” to install and maintain highly efficient equipment in exchange for a share of 
the resulting energy efficiency cost savings. Due to the large fixed costs involved in such efforts, extending the model 




Chapter 5: Discount Rates and Investment  
As the previous chapters have shown, household energy consumption and 
investment are influenced by price and planned tenure within the home. There is also 
evidence that people may think about energy and the cost of energy consumption 
differently from other types of economic activities (Allcott, 2010).  
The energy-efficiency “paradox” has been interpreted to imply higher discount 
rates for energy efficiency than for other types of technology. Researchers have 
suggested a host of behavior differences and market failures that may explain such 
behavior (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). Yet, little research has examined the central 
question of whether consumers directly value energy and non-energy 
expenditures/savings differently: transaction costs and information asymmetry make it 
difficult to recover true rates of time preference from purchase behavior alone. The 
individual rate of time preference is one of the fundamental determinants of consumer 
investment behavior, and differential discounting between energy and non-energy 
investments poses an enormous challenge to energy efficiency policy. The extent that this 
discounting behavior can be quantified and understood will inform our understanding of 
energy efficiency investment in general, and will be useful to improve policy design. 
Previous literature on personal discount rates suggests a wide variation in 
estimates depending on the setting. Earlier studies on appliance discounting, for example, 
exhibit remarkable variation: Hausman (1979) finds discount rates from 5% to 89%, 
Gately (1980) between 45% and 300%, and Ruderman et al. (1986), 17% to 243%. 




and assumptions.49 Context also matters a great deal. Using a single sample, Thaler 
(1981) reports individual discount rates for money from 1% to 345%, and reports higher 
discount rates for smaller amounts of money, or for shorter lengths of time. Discount rate 
also varies according to personal characteristics such as income (Train, 1985), age, and 
gender (Curtis, 2002).  
Even the very concept of a single personal discount rate, implying a rate of time 
preference that remains constant over time, is questionable. Time-inconsistent 
discounting has been observed in many settings (Frederick et al., 2002). Hyperbolic 
discounting (e.g., Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002) is increasingly used 
in the literature as a more realistic approximation to the individual choice.  
 I designed and conducted a survey of Maryland households specifically to fill 
some of the gaps implicit in my other sources of data and to allow me to observe choice 
under well-specified, but hypothetical conditions. I use these data to estimate individual 
discount rates. My contribution is to provide direct estimates of the discount rate for 
energy and non-energy contexts from the same sample, and to understand how household 
and dwelling characteristics, including energy consumption, influence individual 
discounting and the differences between energy and non-energy discount rates. I study 
homeowners in the state of Maryland, and I ask three research questions: (1) what is the 
discount rate that homeowners apply to future energy savings? (2) what are the most 
important individual characteristics in explaining rate of time preference? and, (3) do 
homeowners discount energy savings differently than money? I focus on internal 
discount rate comparisons: in other words, I document and characterize the difference 
                                                 




between energy and non-energy discount rates within the same sample, and over 
comparable time scales (a money-versus-money tradeoff with a horizon of 10 years, and 
appliances with a lifetime of 10 to 17 years).  
A. Maryland Energy Survey Data 
The source of data for this chapter is a survey of homeowners in Southern 
Maryland.50 The survey was conducted in the fall of 2011 to examine the energy 
investment and consumption behavior of homeowners. The survey data are combined 
with data on the structural characteristics of the home (taken from a state database of all 
properties in Maryland maintained for tax purposes), as well as demographic data at the 
tract and block group level (from the U.S. Census).  
A.1 Survey Design 
The sample I wish to survey is comprised of 10,000 single-family homes and 
townhomes (attached homes) from three counties in Southern Maryland: St. Mary’s, 
Charles, and Calvert. 51  As I explain below, this “desired” sample is a combination of 
stratified and choice-based samples. The stratified sample was drawn from the universe 
of older homes in those counties. Accordingly, the stratified sample contained (i) homes 
built between 1940-1990, and (ii) homes built between 1990-2000. The survey 
questionnaire elicits extensive information about recent energy efficiency renovations an 
activities, so I augmented each of these two samples with: (iii) households that applied 
                                                 
50 This geographic region was chosen because the homes are within the service territory of the local electric monopoly, 
hence all electricity rates and tariffs are constant across individuals. 
 
51 The survey is targeted at those who own the home and pay their own energy bills, those that rent or have utility-
included housing arrangements have markedly different incentives to invest in energy efficiency; I restrict attention to 




for a residential building permits with their county of residence between January 2007 
and June 2011 (see data appendix C), and (iv) households that received energy efficiency 
incentives (such as efficient light bulbs, rebates for efficient equipment, and audits) from 
the local utility in early 2011, and (v) homes containing those that had moved within the 
past 12 months. I argue that (iii), (iv), and (v) are more likely to have recent experience or 
interest in energy efficiency renovations, and for these reasons, are choice-based samples. 
 I mailed letters to 10,000 households asking them to participate in a web-based 
survey. Of these, 44 were returned as undeliverable. Out of the 9,956 successful 
deliveries, I was able to get a total of 1,143 completed questionnaires (6 of which were 
conducted by phone), for a response rate of 11.4%. A detailed breakdown of survey 
respondents by wave and target is included in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of respondents and targets by group 
    Charles  Calvert  St. Marys Total 
Group           
Recent Movers 
mail 655 276 273 1253 
response 38 21 24 83 
Incentives Group 
mail 483 255 428 1216 
response 83 51 78 223 
Homes 1940-1990 
mail 1638 617 1057 3493 
response 163 81 111 372 
Homes 1990-2000 
mail 1715 893 956 3770 
response 150 101 85 352 
Building Permits 
mail 385 178 357 920 
response 49 33 47 129 
Wave 1 
mail 2372 887 1544 5000 
response 284 135 213 641 
Wave 2 
mail 2197 1207 1349 5000 
response 199 152 132 502 
Total 
mail 4569 2094 2893 10,000 





 As mentioned, the survey was web-based. Simple instructions on locating and 
taking the survey were printed on the survey invitation. The survey questionnaire itself 
was programmed with SurveyMonkey, a professional survey website, and was hosted at 
www.energyumd.org, a domain name acquired specifically for the survey. A contact 
email address, phone number, and another web address linking to a survey fact page were 
included to provide support if necessary.52 Twenty-four phone calls were received while 
the survey was in the field. These calls were from individuals requiring assistance in 
locating or completing the survey, or from those who did not have access to a computer 
but were still interested in participating.53 Detailed survey materials are included in 
appendix C. 
I anticipated that the survey questionnaire could be completed in approximately 
30 minutes without requiring past electricity bills or other information. Indeed, the 
median completion time was 21 minutes. I note here that my unit of observation is the 
household: I do not identify whether the survey respondent is the head of the household, 
or a spouse or co-habitator. The following instruction is included early in the survey to 
encourage participation on the part of the bill-payer or head-of-household:  
In this section of the questionnaire we would like to ask you some questions about the 
utilities in your home. 
 
If you are not familiar with your household’s utility bills, please get some assistance 
from a person who pays these bills or is familiar with them. 
 
                                                 
52 The website, energy.arec.umd.edu , contained basic information about the goal of the survey, contact information for 
the principle investigators, and links to University administration and human subjects office. A phone number on the 
recruitment letter and the support website connected to a mobile phone that I carried for the duration of the survey. A 
support email address likewise forwarded to me.  
 
53 Six individuals were given phone surveys, one individual was turned away because a written questionnaire was not 




 There were two separate ‘waves’ of the survey, each composed of 5,000 potential 
respondents. For each of these 2 waves, an initial invitation letter to participate in the 
survey was sent, followed by a reminder letter between two and four weeks later. The 
invitation letter for the first wave was mailed September 16, 2011; the second wave 
invitation was mailed November 16, 2011. For the first wave only, a second reminder 
letter was mailed. Enticements were offered to participants of the survey. In wave 1, 
participants were offered the chance to opt-in to a prize drawing to win one of sixteen 
$100 gift cards. In wave 2, I offered four $100 gift cards, four $200 gift cards, and one 
$400 gift card. A table containing the mailing dates and enticement amounts is shown 
below (table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: Sequence of Mailings and Enticements for Survey 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Mailing Date 
Invitation 9/16/11 11/16/11 
Reminder 10/18/11 11/30/11 
Second Reminder 11/2/11 - 
Enticements 
$100 16 4 
$200 0 4 
$400 0 1 
Overall Response (%) 12.82 10.07 
 
Data on structural characteristics of the homes in the sample were taken from a 
state property database. The database includes geo-referenced data for Maryland 
properties and is maintained by the Maryland State Department of Planning for tax 
purposes. From the property database, structural characteristics of the home were 
gathered, including year built, square footage, number of floors, and type of home and 




and population demographics at the 2000 U.S. Census tract level (which is the most 
recent at this level of detail). This provides summary neighborhood characteristics, such 
as income, education, ethnicity, and property structures and values.  
The final dataset, matched to structural and census data, contains over 500 
variables. For the 10,000 homeowners that were invited to participate in the survey, I 
have data on the characteristics of their dwellings plus neighborhood characteristics at the 
Census tract/block group level. I have survey responses, included detailed demographics, 
for 1,143 households. Descriptive statistics are reported in table 5.4. 
A.2 Structure of the Questionnaire 
The survey questionnaire is composed of 5 distinct sections. The questionnaire 
begins by collecting information on the respondent’s home and neighborhood (with some 
neighborhood-related questions serving as “warm-up” questions), and the average cost of 
heating and cooling the home. The second section of the questionnaire leads the 
respondent through a battery of questions about recent and future heating, cooling, 
insulation, and appliance renovations.54 These questions are designed with skip logic to 
allow, for example, a respondent with no air conditioning to skip past that section. The 
third section poses a series of hypothetical questions about appliance replacement, rate of 
time-preference for money, and risk attitudes. The fourth section focuses on respondent 
monitoring of electric consumption. The final section elicits demographic information, 
such as number of occupants and household income. 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of two choice experiments under perfect 
certainty: Choice Experiment 1 asks respondents to choose between hypothetical energy-
                                                 




using appliances, while Choice Experiment 2 asks respondents to choose between a 
lump-sum and annual payouts. I describe these choice experiments below.  
A.3 Choice Experiment 1 (Energy) 
Respondents are asked to imagine replacing a generic home appliance, and given a choice 
between two alternatives: 
Imagine that an essential home appliance (for example, refrigerator or washing machine) 
suddenly broke and needed replacement.  
 
You have narrowed down your options to Appliance A and Appliance B, which are identical to 
each other and to the Appliance you must replace in every way, except for the differences listed 
in the table below. 
 
The alternatives vary in three dimensions: Purchase price, energy savings, and lifetime 
(Figure 2): Respondents are randomly assigned to one of 16 choice pairs for question 
one. The choice is forced (respondents can choose only A or B).  
 








Screen 2 of the choice experiment reveals a second choice task in which the 
respondents are assigned randomly to a separate set of 16 choice pairs (see Table 2): 
Suppose instead that you were choosing between the two appliances listed below. 
 
Again, Appliance C and Appliance D would be identical to each other and to the appliance you 
need to replace, except for the differences listed. 
 
Again, respondents are forced to choose between the two choices, C or D, without being 
given a status quo or indifference alternative. Approximately 6 % (~ 1/16) of the sample 
was assigned to each choice pair.  
Many choice experiments offer respondents the choice of a status quo. I omitted 
this alternative for 3 reasons: First, I do not observe the household’s status quo. It would 
be impractical, without collecting additional detail on the specific appliances in the home, 
to construct a plausible alternative to the choices that were offered, and I judged this to be 
imprudent given the length of the questionnaire. Secondly, given the limited budget 
available to design and implement the survey, I wanted to achieve a sufficiently large 
sample size to estimate the model. As it was not practical to construct a reasonable status 
quo option, allowing respondents not to choose between hypothetical alternatives (a ‘do 
nothing’ status quo option) would risk imperiling the sample size available to estimate a 
choice model. Finally, I wanted respondents to focus on the choice attributes, not on 
whether they would make the choice. 
 Validity of hypothetical choice experiments often depends crucially on the 
suitability of the assumptions and context. One area where experiments are often 
criticized is in the effects of framing (intentional or not). Here, respondents are instructed 




are provided: a refrigerator and a washing machine. Data on household appliances 
indicates that these are essential: According to the 2009 American Housing Survey data, 
93.4% of U.S. households own a washing machine and 99.8% own a refrigerator. (For 
the state of Maryland, the percentages are 93.8% and 99.8%, respectively.) In addition, 
washing machines and refrigerators are appliances that are relatively easy to replace. 
While a range or stove may also be an essential appliance for most households, replacing 
it may involve a costly and invasive kitchen modification (for example, counters and 
cabinets may have to be reconfigured). To avoid conflating the process of replacement 
with the actual purchase decision, the simpler appliances were displayed.  
A second potential issue is with the price and performance of the appliances. An 
informal survey of appliance retailers found washing machine options ranging from $250 
to $1499, and refrigerator options from $200 to over $3000.55 Data on the appliance 
prices are not standardized, but these anecdotal numbers compare favorably with the 
choice pairs offered (Table 5.6). The questionnaire also instructed respondents to assume 
that the new appliance is identical in all respects to the old one, except for purchase price, 
lifetime, and savings on energy costs (the choice attributes). 
  
                                                 




Table 5.3 Choice pairs offered in Experiment 1 







Lifetime δ* N % 
1 800 100 13 500 200 8 -0.11 52 4.94 
2 1000 100 13 1000 200 8 -0.07 74 7.03 
3 800 25 10 1000 40 13 0.04 67 6.36 
4 300 40 10 1500 200 17 0.12 72 6.84 
5 1000 200 5 1000 40 17 -0.06 67 6.36 
6 1500 200 13 500 100 8 0.08 73 6.93 
7 500 200 5 300 25 13 0.86 73 6.93 
8 300 200 8 1000 100 13 -0.14 69 6.55 
9 500 40 10 300 25 5 0.05 57 5.41 
10 500 40 5 300 25 5 -0.34 70 6.65 
11 1000 200 5 1500 100 10 -0.11 57 5.41 
12 500 40 17 300 40 5 0.08 70 6.65 
13 500 100 13 300 100 5 0.16 62 5.89 
14 1500 200 13 500 40 13 0.13 63 5.98 
15 800 40 5 500 25 17 0.43 60 5.70 
16 800 200 17 300 25 5 0.36 67 6.36 
Total 1053 
1 300 100 17 500 200 10 -0.02 65 6.17 
2 300 25 10 300 40 5 0.1 64 6.08 
3 800 200 5 300 40 13 0.08 67 6.36 
4 500 40 17 800 100 13 0.17 59 5.6 
5 1500 100 10 500 40 5 -0.04 65 6.17 
6 800 200 8 300 100 17 0.14 52 4.94 
7 1500 100 17 1000 200 10 -0.08 65 6.17 
8 500 25 8 800 200 17 0.58 63 5.98 
9 1500 100 17 1000 100 8 0.05 56 5.32 
10 500 200 5 300 100 10 0.2 64 6.08 
11 1000 40 17 800 40 5 0.08 67 6.36 
12 1500 200 5 800 100 5 -0.13 83 7.88 
13 1500 25 8 800 25 5 -0.34 62 5.89 
14 800 25 13 1500 40 10 0.01 79 7.5 
15 1500 200 5 1500 100 10 0 67 6.36 
16 300 25 10 1500 100 5 -0.03 75 7.12 
Total 1053 




A.4 Choice Experiment 2 (money-versus-money) 
The second choice experiment focuses on the pure time-money tradeoff. Respondents are 
given a choice between a lump-sum payment now, and a series of annual payments of 
randomly assigned amount X: 
Now imagine that you just won the lottery. The prize is $1000. You have a choice: 
- receive $1000 today 
- receive 10 annual payments of $X each year 
Where “$X” in the questionnaire is a dollar value ranging from $95 to $173 (implying 
discount rates from -0.01 to 0.11 assuming constant exponential discounting). 
Respondents are given the choice to take $1000 today, annual payments for 10 years, or 
indifference: “either – no preference.” I assigned respondents at random to one of 7 
variants (approximately 14%). The choice and response frequencies, along with 
indifference discount rates, are given in table 5.4.  
Table 5.4 Choice pairs offered in Experiment 2, with indifference discount rate 
Lump Sum Annual Payment Lifetime δ* N % 
1000 95 10 -0.01 131 12.45 
1000 100 10 0 146 13.88 
1000 105 10 0.01 149 14.16 
1000 114 10 0.02 163 15.49 
1000 123 10 0.04 154 14.64 
1000 148 10 0.08 143 13.59 
1000 173 10 0.11 166 15.78 
Total 1052 
   δ* is the discount rate of indifference between Annual Payments and Lump Sum 
 
The questionnaire is deliberately structured to mitigate some of the concerns 




limit comparisons (Train 1985), and for this reason I examine the same subjects’ 
responses to the two choice questions above. The influence of household characteristics 
on the time preference for money will thus be constant across choice questions. The size 
of the investment, and the length of time over which savings accrue have a large effect on 
discounting (Thaler, 1981). Here, the annual savings and income between the energy 
(from $25 to $200) and non-energy settings (from $95 to $173), and the lifetime of over 
which the savings are realized (from 5 to 17 years, and 10 years, respectively), are very 
similar.  
One area where the two experiments differ is the context (energy-savings from 
appliances versus generic money). Another difference is that the energy choice 
experiment requires an up-front investment of money, whereas the income choice 
experiment does not. I argue that by requiring the respondent to choose an (hypothetical) 
investment, and generalizing the choice to a generic “essential” appliance, the context 
allows the respondent to focus purely on the time-money tradeoff in the energy setting, 
and facilitates an apples-to-apples comparison with choice experiment 2.   
Finally, energy efficiency investments are often characterized as highly uncertain, 
which some argue is the basis for why they are chosen less often than other classes of 
investments (Greene, 2011). By providing consumers with perfect information on energy 
savings for a hypothetical appliance, I estimate the direct discount rate for future savings 
on energy bills.56 This allows direct comparison to the pure rate of time preference 
estimated from the money-versus-money choice experiment.  
                                                 





A.5 Characteristics of the Sample 
Although efforts were made to survey homeowners based upon exogenous 
characteristics (e.g., the age of their home), and enticements were offered to increase 
participation in the survey, external validity and representativeness are always concerns 
in survey work. My sample is less racially diverse (more White, less Black, Hispanic or 
Asian), lower income, and with a larger family size than the average Maryland household 
(table 5.5). Consequently, there may be differences in rate of time preference between my 
sample and the population at large. Other concerns relate to selection into the survey. A 
survey respondent with 30 minutes of free time, internet access, and the motivation to 
complete the questionnaire may differ in important ways from the average American 
electricity consumer.57  
Table 5.5 Respondent Comparison to State of MD Population (US Census) 
Variable MD (2010) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
White (%) 58.2 76.4 13.37 28 94 
Black (%) 29.4 18.7 11.93 3 61 
Hispanic (%) 8.2 2.0 1.39 0 6 
Asian (%) 5.5 1.6 1.12 0 4 
< 6 years old (%) 6.3 6.8 1.44 4 13 
> 64 years old (%) 12.3 8.5 3.39 0 20 
Household (N Persons) 2.62 2.9 0.20 2.5 3.82 
Rent (Median) 698 812.1 182.68 468 1232 
< Poverty Line (%) 8.6 5.0 2.88 0 18 
Income (Median) 70,647 65050.5 11490.92 37040 99246 
 
 
                                                 
57 In particular, those without access to the internet, and those disinclined to take a 30 minute survey (and unmoved by 
a chance to win a $100 prize), will largely be missing from a survey following that follows this approach. Non-response 
bias is a concern in any survey, and, to some extent, the professional survey samples often used for marketing and 




Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics for survey sample 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
High Income 1038 0.383 0.486 0 1 
Low Income 1038 0.114 0.318 0 1 
Child 1036 0.408 0.492 0 1 
Elderly 1036 0.106 0.308 0 1 
High School 1038 0.209 0.407 0 1 
Grad School 1143 0.239 0.427 0 1 
Small House 1143 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Big House 1143 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Moved < 5yrs 1143 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Going to Move 1143 0.160 0.367 0 1 
No Programmable Thermostat 1092 0.193 0.395 0 1 
Price Increase 1143 0.532 0.499 0 1 
Price Decrease 1143 0.018 0.133 0 1 
Home Age 30+ 1143 0.327 0.469 0 1 
High Winter Bill 1143 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Low Winter Bill 1143 0.187 0.390 0 1 
High Summer Bill 1143 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Low Summer Bill 1143 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Low ID # (check) 1143 0.500 0.500 0 1 
High Winter bill (no elect) 1086 0.257 0.437 0 1 
 
A series of dummy variables was created to explore the dependence of discount 
rate on household characteristics (table 5.6). High Income and Low Income signify a 
household income above $120,000 per year (38% of the sample), or below $50,000 per 
year (11% of the sample), respectively. The dummy variables Child and Elderly signify 
whether there is a dependent child (40% of the sample) or an adult over 65 years of age in 
the household (11% of the sample). Education level is represented by a dummy variable 
indicating whether the maximum education attainment was at the high school level or 




degree (Grad School, 24% of the sample).58 The size of the dwelling is captured with the 
variables Big house and Small house, indicating a square footage of above 2500 (20% of 
the sample) or below 1200 sq. feet (14% of the sample).  
As discussed in Chapter 4, tenure is important to energy consumption and 
investment decisions; I create a dummy variable for those that have moved within the 
past 5 years (19% of the sample), or who report that they will definitely move in the next 
5 years (16% of the sample). Although most of the survey respondents indicate that they 
have a programmable thermostat in their home (or that they do not know whether they 
do), I create the dummy variable no_ptstat for those that report not having one (19% of 
the sample). As one of the most simple and cost-effective energy changes you can make 
to your home, the absence of a programmable thermostat may indicate neglect of energy 
efficiency in general, or inability to implement even simple energy efficiency measure.  
Price expectations are captured in two dummies, Price Increase and Price 
Decrease, which take a value of 1 when the respondent reports that they expect an 
electricity price increase (decrease) in the coming year, and zero otherwise (53% and 
1.8% of the sample, respectively). The age of the home is positively correlated with the 
need for energy investment, and therefore, possibly inversely correlated to discount rate 
for energy. Homes built before 1980, Home Age 30+, account for 32% of the sample. In 
the survey, respondents were asked to report the average amount of their winter and 
summer electricity bills. Low Winter Bill and Low Summer Bill indicates a bill of less 
than $100 (19% and 18% of the sample, respectively), and High (Winter or Summer) Bill 
                                                 
58 This refers to education level of the respondent. I treat the respondent as the head of the household, but this is not a 
critical assumption. Questions about intra-household relationships were excised to limit the length of the survey; As 
discussed in Chapter 3, I encourage somebody who is familiar with the energy usage of the home (e.g., a bill-payer or 




indicates a bill of more than $400 (10% and 7% of the sample, respectively). High Winter 
Bill (non-elec) indicates a reported non-electric heating bill of more than $1000 for the 
entire winter (5% of the sample). Finally, as a robustness check, Low ID indicates that the 
respondent has an (randomly assigned) ID number in the lower half of the distribution. 
This dummy variable has no relation to any meaningful observable characteristic of the 
respondent, and is thus statistically insignificant by design.  
After completing Choice Experiment 1 in the survey questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to use a Likert-type scale to rate the importance of each of the appliance 
attributes (price, appliance lifetime, and annual energy savings) in shaping their decision. 
Options ranged from 1 “Not important at all” to 5 “Very important” (See Appendix C, 
Figure 3). Using these ratings, variables were created to classify the relative importance 
of the attributes to the respondent. For example, Pricemost (20.5%) is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 if price has the highest rating, and 0 otherwise. Lifemost (13.6%) 
and Savemost (7.3%) were constructed in a similar fashion. Likewise, dummy variables 
were created to indicate that one of the attributes was “not at important at all” to the 
decision (a rating of 1): Pricenot (0.1%), Lifenot (0.7%) and Savenot (0.8%) (Table 5.5).  
At the close of the questionnaire, respondents are asked to rate, again using a 
Likert-type scale, their level of agreement of several statements about energy and energy 
efficiency (1 for “Strongly disagree” to 5 for “Strongly agree”, Figure 4 in Appendix C). 
Dummy variables were created to indicate that the respondent strongly agrees or 





 “I view energy efficiency as a money saving investment.” Strongly disagree: EE 
Invest (no) (1.1%), strongly agree: EE Invest (yes) (54.6%)  
 “I regularly look for ways to save on my energy usage” –strongly disagree: EE 
Save (no) (1.3%), strongly agree: EE Save (yes) (34.8%) 
 “The resale value of an energy-efficient home is higher.” – strongly disagree: EE 
Resale (no) (1.7%), strongly agree: EE Resale (yes) (29.9%) 
Table 5.7 Descriptive statistics for rating variables 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price most important 1038 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Lifetime most important 1038 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Savings most important 1038 0.073 0.261 0 1 
Price not important 1049 0.010 0.097 0 1 
Savings not important 1048 0.007 0.081 0 1 
Lifetime not important 1043 0.008 0.087 0 1 
EE Invest (yes) 1042 0.546 0.498 0 1 
EE Invest (no) 1040 0.011 0.102 0 1 
EE Save (yes) 1044 0.348 0.476 0 1 
EE Save (no) 1044 0.013 0.115 0 1 
EE Resale (yes) 1041 0.299 0.458 0 1 
EE Resale (no) 1041 0.017 0.130 0 1 
 
B. Model and Estimation 
The focus of this research centers on the estimation of consumer rate of time 
preference rates. Using the responses to the hypothetical choice questions, I estimate a 
model of an energy efficiency investment in the home (section B.1), and a pure money-
time tradeoff (B.2).  
B.1 Discounting Future Energy Savings 
 
I assume that the responses to the choice questions are driven by the consumer’s 




is a function of the attributes of the alternative, and  is the error term. The consumer 
will select the alternative j that maximizes utility. The probability of selecting a particular 
choice is: 
	,				∀	    (5.1) 
If the error term is independent and identically distributed as Type 1 Extreme value, with 
a scale of 1, the probability of selecting choice k becomes: 
	
∑ exp	
    (5.2) 
 Assuming that the survey responses to the hypothetical choice questions follow the 
random utility model, and that purchase price (capital cost), C, and appliance savings 
(operating cost), Σ, are additively separable, I write the indirect utility equation as:  
	 Σ       (5.3) 
where  and  are the marginal utilities of money. I assume constant exponential 
discounting.59 The discounted flow of savings from the hypothetical appliance is:  
Σ 1       (5.4) 
I estimate the following model to identify the discount rates for energy savings (5.5): 
	 1 			,			 ,     (5.5) 
To identify my model, I need to place additional restrictions on the parameters. 
The coefficient on project cost, , and the coefficient on discounted present value of 
                                                 
59 Recent evidence indicates consumers having non-constant discount rates, particularly in contexts with very short-
term contexts (e.g., tomorrow versus one year from now, Frederick et al., 2002). Appliance lifetimes are sufficiently 
long (10-20 years) to mute that effect. In the money-versus-money context, this issue is more of a concern, but I argue 
that the familiar lottery context (‘upfront vs. annual payments’) and sufficiently large payout ($1000) are enough to 




energy savings, 	can be interpreted as the marginal utility of money. Assuming that 
consumers assign the same marginal utility to costs as they do to savings, then the 
coefficients on purchase price and discounted savings should be equal (with opposite 
signs). To estimate the discount rate of energy savings, I impose the restriction . 
To investigate the effect of individual characteristics on discount rate, I amend the 
discount rate to make it a function of household characteristics. For example, I estimate a 
model where: ∙ , where  represents high or low income, education, age, 
electricity usage, or tenure in the home.  
B.2 Discounting Future Income 
In the money-versus-money experiment (Choice Experiment 2), the respondent is 
assumed to have utility only over income, and that the choice responses follow the 
random utility model. The indirect utility is: 	 , where S is equal either to 
$1000 for the lump-sum payment, or the present value of future payments for the 
disbursement option.  
Recall that one of the choice alternatives for Choice Experiment 2 is “no 
preference” between the lump-sum payout and annual payments. Approximately 5% of 
the sample (55 respondents) chose this option, indicating indifference between the two 
options.  
For each lump sum – payout pair, I first calculate the discount rate for which the 
two are equivalent (the indifference discount rate, ∗) by setting equation 5.4 equal to the 
$1000 lump sum and solving. Assuming that individual discount rate is normally 
distributed: ~ , , I write the probability that the respondent chooses the lump 








Φ ∗   (5.8) 
where 	   and  	 1  . Similarly, the probability of choosing annual payouts 
over the lump sum is: 
Pr 	 ∗ Φ ∗           (5.9) 
Indifference implies that the respondent’s personal  is approximately equal to ∗ 
and that this person’s contribution to the likelihood is the normal density evaluated at: 
φ ∗ . 








φ ∗  
where SL, SP, and SI indicate lump sum, annual payments, and indifference, respectively. 
I estimate this model using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. I also include discount rate 
interactions, as in section B.1. The results are reported in table 5. 13 – table 5.15.  
C. Results 
C.1 Comparison of Discount Rates 
 
The first research task was to estimate individual discount rates for energy savings 
and for money. Table 5.8 reports discount rates calculated for energy savings and for 
money. In column (A), I estimate the discount rate for energy savings. It is approximately 
0.025 (p-value 0.05). In column (B), I report the discount rate for money from the lottery 




statistically significant, and I soundly reject the hypothesis that the rates are equal (t-
statistic of 186). 60  
Table 5.8 Discount rate estimates 
  (A) (B) 
Model Energy Money 

















Log-likelihood -1255.527 -313.255 
N Obs 2092 1052 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parenthesis;  
(2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
While the estimate of the discount rate for money (0.08) is in line with the 
estimates in other studies, the estimate for the discount rate for energy savings is lower 
than those reported in previous studies (see Train, 1985). My findings, however, are 
consistent with Train’s point that discount rates in the energy context are lower when 
based on hypothetical choices. Moreover, whereas the energy efficiency paradox posits 
that consumers apply a higher discount rate to energy savings than to money, I find the 
opposite: the estimate for the energy savings discount rate is lower than the discount rate 
for money. This is a striking result. In a recent working paper, Alberini, Banfi, and 
                                                 
60 To alleviate concern that the difference is discounting is driven by formulaic assumptions, I re-estimate the models 
using alternative discount formulations. I find that although the rates themselves vary, but the difference between them 




Remseier (2011) estimate similar discount rates for energy savings using a choice 
experiment for hypothetical renovations in Swiss households. They reason that such a 
low discount rate for energy savings may be attributable to the absence of uncertainty or 
the abstract context of the hypothetical choice question. Yet both of these circumstances 
apply to the choice experiment for income, suggesting that the idea that consumers 
discount energy savings at a greater rate than money should be viewed with caution. 
C.2 Interaction of Discount Rate with Sample Characteristics – Energy Savings 
To understand how rate of time preference for energy savings varies with 
household characteristics, I interact discount rate with selected variables in table 5.9 – 
table 5.12. I include both single interactions (i.e. ) and specifications with 
multiple interactions ( ⋯ ).  
Income is often thought to be an important determinant of rate of time preference 
(e.g., Hausman, 1979, Curtis, 2002). I find that income level significantly determines 
discount rate for energy savings, in the direction expected. Lower income households 
have a higher discount rate for energy savings than the rest of the sample. For rich 
households, the effect is the opposite. The effects are similar, although not statistically 
significant, for the discount rates estimated in the money-versus-money choice. 
Education plays a limited role in discounting, with education level inversely 
correlated to discount rate. The effect is only significant in the money-versus-money 
setting: those with a high school education have an increased discount rate, whereas 





Table 5.9 Discount (Energy) Interactions with Household Characteristics 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
Beta1 
-0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 
(0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00012) 
Beta2 
0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 
(0.00011) (0.00025) (0.00017) (0.00018) (0.0002) (0.00016) (0.00015) 
Delta 
(energy) 
0.0161* 0.0354 0.0232 0.0227 0.0287 0.0222 0.0221 




(0.024)      (0.0244) 
High 
Income 
-0.0328*      
 (0.0156)      
Elderly 
 -0.00816 -0.0115 
  (0.0208)    (0.0206) 
Child 
-0.00048 
   (0.0128)    
Grad 
School 
    -0.0221 -0.0168 
    (0.0143)  (0.0136) 
High 
School 
     0.00173  
     (0.0163)  
Log-
likelihood 
-1217.759 -1218.025 -1221.28 -1221.352 -1220.088 -1221.347 -1216.815 
LR test 400.84 400.308 393.797 393.654 396.183 393.663 402.727 
N Obs 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parenthesis; (2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Recent movers are also seen to have a lower discount rate for energy than the 
sample at large (the effect is not statistically significant on income). This may be because 
certain recent movers make renovations and appliance purchases as part of their 
relocation, and are thus more patient with appliance-related savings than those who have 





Table 5.10 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with choice characteristics 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Beta1 
-0.00153*** -0.00152*** -0.00152*** -0.00154*** -0.00152*** -0.00155*** 
(0.000113) (0.000115) (0.000115) (0.000115) (0.000114) (0.000124) 
Beta2 
0.00153*** 0.00152*** 0.00152*** 0.00154*** 0.00152*** 0.00155*** 
(0.000162) (0.000189) (0.000183) (0.000177) (0.000181) (0.000151) 
Delta (energy) 
0.0152 0.0251 0.0244 0.0302 0.0249 0.0289* 




(0.0164)     (0.0168) 
Yes rebate 
 -0.0106     
 (0.0146)     
No rebate 
  -0.0126   -0.013 
  (0.0171)   (0.0164) 
Recent Mover 
   -0.0437** -0.0404** 
   (0.0155)  (0.0151) 
Going to Move 
    -0.0133 -0.0199 
    (0.0158) (0.0152) 
Log-likelihood -1219.076 -1221.085 -1221.085 -1217.648 -1221.008 -1215.125 
LR test 398.206 394.188 394.189 401.062 394.343 406.109 
N Obs 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parenthesis); (2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Expectations of electricity price changes influence the discount rate in a 
surprising way. Those reporting that they expect electricity prices to increase in the next 
year have a significantly higher discount rate than those that do not. This suggests that 
something other than simple energy savings is driving the discounting behavior of these 
individuals. The price rise group may not be representative of the entire sample, as the 
converse of the relationship does not hold: those reporting that they expect the electricity 







Table 5.11 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with bills and price expectations 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) 
Beta1 
-0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 
(0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00011) (0.0001) (0.00011) (0.00012) 
Beta2 
0.00152*** 0.00153*** 0.00153*** 0.00154*** 0.00143*** 0.00152*** 0.00153*** 
(0.000172) (0.000189) (0.000173) (0.000163) (0.0001) (0.000165 (0.000151) 
Delta 
(energy) 
0.0236 0.0273 0.026 0.0152 - 0.0213 0.0274* 


























     (0.0548) (0.0536) 
Log-
likelihood 
-1221.063 -1219.47 -1220.315 -1216.293 -1222.933 -1220.7 -1218.643 
LR test 394.232 397.419 395.729 403.773 390.492 394.959 399.072 
N Obs 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parenthesis; (2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Interestingly, the self-reported average electricity bill seems to be important in 
explaining discounting. A high winter or summer bill for electricity seems to be 
negatively correlated with discount rate. A higher bill might indicate a greater appetite for 
efficiency improvements, and this would tend to lower the discount rate compared to the 
sample at large, but the mechanism would not apply to the money-versus-money discount 
rate.  
 Efficiency attitudes did not play an important role in discounting for energy 




efficiency are significant in explaining the discount rate for energy savings, and the signs 
of the coefficients are not consistent or intuitive (Appendix, Table AC.1).  
In contrast, attribute rankings from Choice Experiment 1 have a significant 
influence on the discount rate for energy savings. Respondents that ranked price as the 
most important attribute in their decision had a significantly higher discount rate than the 
sample, and those that rated price as “not important at all” (Pricenot = 1) had a 
significantly lower discount rate. The role of the appliance lifetime was the reverse: those 
indicating that lifetime was the most important had a lower discount rate (those indicating 
the lifetime was not important at all had a much higher, but statistically insignificant 
discount rate). In this way, appliance price and lifetime play a similar role to income and 
education in the rate of time preference: those concerned more limited resources tend to 
be more concerned about upfront costs than operating costs (high discount rate), whereas 
those with higher income place greater value on durability (lower discount rate). 
Meanwhile, the role of potential appliance savings was less clear. Those 
indicating that savings were the most important attribute tended to have a higher (though 
not significantly so) discount rate, while those that indicated savings was not important at 
all had a much lower discount rate than the average respondent. Because the categories 
are not mutually exclusive, it is difficult to say with certainty what distinguishes those 
that do not value energy savings from other groups; it could be that durability is the only 
attribute that concerns them, and they are willing to pay any premium for it, or it could be 
that the range of energy savings offered in the Choice Experiment were all of sufficient 
improvement that the choices were made based entirely upon the other attributes. This 




Table 5.12 Discount (Energy) - Interactions with energy investment attitudes 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Beta1 
-0.00157*** -0.00193*** -0.00152*** -0.00153*** -0.00191*** -0.00156*** 
(0.000118) (8.90E-05) (0.000124) (0.000115) (0.000113) (0.000126) 
Beta2 
0.00157*** 0.00193*** 0.00152*** 0.00153*** 0.00191*** 0.00156*** 
(0.000192) (4.07E-05) (0.000153) (0.000174) (0.000113) (0.000154) 
Delta (energy) 
0.0356* - 0.0236* 0.0242 - 0.0229 

























Log-likelihood -1184.565 -1123.119 -1197.916 -1198.693 -1118.572 -1195.531 
LR test 420.095 542.986 393.393 391.839 563.171 409.253 
N Obs 2012 2012 2012 2012 2020 2020 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parentheses; (2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
C.3 Interaction of Discount Rate with Sample Characteristics – Money 
Turning to the discount rate for money (Choice Experiment 2), I find that the 
household characteristic interactions, while generally insignificant, are intuitive (table 
5.13 and 5.14). Lower income households apply a greater discount rate to money, while 
higher income households apply a lower rate. The education level of the household works 
in much the same fashion, as lower education leads to higher discounting and vice versa. 
In column (A) of table 5.13, high school education significantly increases the discount 




Table 5.13 Discount (Money) - Interactions with household characteristics  
(A) (B) (C) 
Intercept 
0.1303*** 0.1319*** 0.1341*** 
(0.0093) (0.008) (0.0087) 
Delta (money) 
0.0841*** 0.0823*** 0.0838*** 





























Log-Likelihood -310.198 -305.919 -312.429 
BIC 655.122 653.496 659.583 
N Obs 1038 1036 1038 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parentheses;  
(2) significance level  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Further regressions yield a significant relationship with Pricemost, the variable 
that indicates that the price of the hypothetical appliance was the most important factor in 
the investment decision (table 5.14). The interaction works in the same way as low 
income or low education: a household that is concerned most about price is likely to be 
credit constrained, and thus will be impatient when evaluating long time-horizon 
investments. The discount rate is more than one-third higher, on average, than the rest of 






Table 5.14 Discount (Money) - Interactions with choice characteristics  
































Log-Likelihood -296.351 -312.303 
BIC 641.175 652.387 
N Obs 1017 1038 
Notes: (1) standard errors in parenthesis;  







Differential discounting of energy and non-energy investments is at the heart of 
the debate over the energy-efficiency paradox. There are a host of market failures and 
behavioral reasons why consumer investment behavior might differ between energy and 
non-energy settings (Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). The empirical literature on energy rate 
of time preference reports a wide range of individual discount rates (Train, 1985). Yet 
direct comparisons between energy and non-energy discounting are rare. If consumers 
truly favor non-energy investments over energy investments, estimates of direct 
discounting for comparable investments should reflect this.  
In this essay, I ask three research questions: (1) at what level to consumers 
discount future energy savings, (2) do consumers discount energy savings differently 
from income, and (3) is the discounting difference explained by house and household 
characteristics? Using data from two choice experiments and a sample of homeowners in 
Maryland, I estimate a discount rate for energy savings of 0.02, and a discount rate for 
money of 0.08. I find these estimates to be statistically distinguishable from zero and 
standard levels of significance, and to be significantly different from each other, for the 
difference to be robust to various specifications. Suggestively, in contrast to the energy 
efficiency ‘paradox’ literature, I estimate that the discount rate for energy is not only 
different, but lower than the discount rate for money.  
In terms of characteristics that explain discount rates, I find evidence that income 
and education are significant in explaining discount rates, and the relationship is intuitive: 
higher income, more educated households tend to have lower discount rates. I find that 




hypothetical investment explained time rate of preference in a consistent and intuitive 
way: those reporting the highest sensitivity to price displayed a higher discount rate, 
while those to whom lifetime was most important, or to whom savings was not important, 
displayed a lower discount rate.    
Recent movers were seen to display a lower discount rate, suggesting that they 
may be more likely to invest in efficient durable goods, given an expectation that they 
will not move again soon. I find further that the estimates of discount rates are robust to 
membership in one of the choice-based subgroups that comprise my sample, suggesting 
that systematic bias does not influence my results. Clearly, this is an exciting area for 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Good stewardship of the planet’s natural resources is the central challenge of our 
age. The world’s (predominantly fossil-fueled) energy consumption, and the attendant 
environmental and geopolitical consequences, frame this challenge amongst a host of 
competing interests, policy initiatives, and consumer behaviors.  
A large and growing fraction of all energy usage occurs in homes. According to 
recent figures, Americans spend, on average, $1800 annually on energy (5% of the 
median household income). Despite its economic importance, it has been difficult for 
analysts to identify which price consumers are responding to (Ito, 2010, Borenstein, 
2009). In a variety of settings, consumers have been shown to forgo profitable energy 
efficiency investment, or to be influenced by consumption feedback (Allcott, 2010; Gans 
et al., 2011). Possible explanations for this behavior include information asymmetry, split 
incentives, and the difficulty of monitoring energy consumption.  
Over the last few decades, many government policies have been targeted at 
residential energy usage, but evidence about the effectiveness of these measures is 
limited. Undoubtedly, a greater understanding of residential energy consumption and 
investment behavior would improve government policy. In this dissertation, I analyzed 
three key aspects of residential energy behavior.  
First, in Chapter 3, I estimated a residential demand function for electricity and 
natural gas on a nationwide panel of U.S. homes. I merged recent longitudinal household 
data drawn from the American Housing Survey from 1997 to 2007, with weather data 
and information about energy prices and the utilities serving each area covered by the 




depend on home and household characteristics, such as size and age of the home and 
level of income of the family. Importantly, however, my models (a static and partial 
adjustment model) allow me to identify both short-term and long-term price elasticities of 
demand, which are much higher than previously appreciated. These results suggest that 
residential consumers are price responsive, even in the short-term, and that price-based 
policies can be an effective tool to promote energy conservation and investment in energy 
efficiency.  
In Chapter 4, I specifically focus on residential investment in energy efficiency 
renovations and improvements. Again using a panel of U.S. homes based upon the 
American Housing Survey, and with the addition of the year 2009 data, I estimate a series 
of demand functions for energy appliances. Significantly, because the AHS follows 
homes, not households, and because I have a relatively long panel length (up to 9 
periods), I can identify a model that explains energy efficiency investments with a 
decision to move or stay within the house. I specifically focus on heating systems, since 
these are durable, long-lived goods that are generally replaced with new (and more 
efficient) ones.  I find the first empirical evidence of split incentives between movers and 
stayers, and estimate that households that move within 2 years are 20% less likely to 
invest in heater renovations or replacements. Strikingly, there is no statistically 
significant relationship between moving or staying and other classes of investment, such 
as kitchen renovations or yard repairs, suggesting that homeowners do not believe that 
energy efficiency is capitalized into the value of the home.  
This has very important policy implications: Requiring disclosure about the 




Indeed, recent evidence (Brounen and Kok, 2011; Eichholtz et al., 2010) suggests that 
signals about the energy efficiency of a building tend to raise it selling price. For the 
U.S., calculations show that eliminating the information asymmetry between the buyer 
and the seller may reduce emissions of CO2 by 900,000 metric tons or more annually. 
In any potential investment, consumers weigh the costs and benefits of a 
purchase. For investments that offer an efficiency improvement on the status quo, 
consumers must value the efficiency premium, i.e., the additional upfront cost that 
translates into reduced operating costs later. Earlier research suggested that residential 
consumers mispriced this efficiency by applying higher discount rates to potential energy 
savings than they did to other investment types. In Chapter 5, I use data from an original 
survey of households to examine how consumers value future savings from energy bills 
vis-à-vis money paid now. I gather original survey data from homeowners in Maryland 
and directly estimate the rate of time preference from choice experiments in two settings: 
a hypothetical energy efficiency investment, and a money now-versus-later scenario. I 
find that consumers apply a lower discount rate to energy savings than to money. Other 
factors thought to influence discount rate (Train, 1985), such as income and education, 
are seen to have an effect. This result suggests that market failures, rather than consumer 
values, may be responsible for a low rate of residential energy efficiency investment. 
These findings are a contribution to the understanding of residential energy 
consumption and investment behavior, and underscore the potential for intelligent policy 






Appendix A: Notes for American Housing Survey Data 
 
Note on price Estimation 
Both our estimate of price and the consumer estimate include taxes paid by 
consumers. In the AHS survey, consumers are asked to report the average monthly 
amount paid for electricity, natural gas, and other fuels. This value captures the after-tax 
amount. Calculations for energy prices based upon the Energy Information Agency forms 
861 and 176 estimate a city-level price for energy: dividing total retail revenues (which 
includes tax) by delivered service (total electricity or natural gas).  
 
Note on square foot imputation 
The square footage of the home is an important driver of energy consumption in 
the home. In the AHS data, square footage estimates are derived from the variable unitsf, 
the respondent’s estimate of the living area (climate-controlled, finished) of their home. If 
one is not given, the interviewer is asked to make an estimate of the home size. If that is 
not possible, the square footage is imputed subsequently based upon comparable homes 
(these ‘hot-decked’ observations are not included in our analysis, see below). 
Nevertheless, there is wide variation in the housing size estimates recorded in unitsf, even 
accounting for self-reported renovations and home additions, which influence the size of 






First, the square footage of the home was compared to a variable denoting 
whether renovations or improvements to the home had resulted in a change of square 
footage (SFCHG). If this dummy variable was zero (no change in square footage), but the 
estimate of square footage was blank, we re-entered the previous value for square 
footage. Likewise, if no subsequent change in square footage is reported, the previous 
value is entered. Observations that are missing an estimate of square footage, and report a 
qualifying renovation in the first year in which square footage is changed, are given a 
missing value for square footage.  
 
Note on unit type 
Several classes of units exist within the AHS data: mobile homes, apartments or 
condos in multi-dwelling buildings, attached homes, and detached or semi-detached 
homes. Our study focuses on single-family detached or semi-detached dwellings. Using 
the ‘TYPE” variable, we select living quarters corresponding to answer 1, which is 
“house, apartment, or flat”. This step excludes mobile homes, hotels and temporary 
dwellings. We also use the variable “NUNIT” and select only living quarters that reflect 
“one-unit building, detached from any other building”, or “one unit building, attached to 
one or more buildings”. These constraints explicitly exclude the remaining answers (3: 
“building with two or more apartments”, and 4: “manufactured (mobile) home”). Finally, 
we select on the variable “NUNITS” which is the number of units in the building. For 
reasons spelled above, we select only observations with a value of “1”.  
 




Both our estimate of price and the consumer estimate include taxes paid by 
consumers. In particular, consumers are asked to report the average monthly amount paid 
for electricity, natural gas, and other fuels. This value captures the after-tax amount. The 
estimates for prices obtained from the Energy Information Agency forms 861 and 176 
calculate a city-level price for energy by dividing total retail revenues (which includes 
tax), divided by delivered service (electricity or natural gas). These price estimates don’t 
capture specific utility rate-plan differences, but they are not systematically biased by a 
tax exclusion. The difference in prices is reported in the graphic below. 
 
Note on square foot imputation 
The square footage of the home is an important driver of energy consumption in 
the home. In the AHS data, square footage estimates are derived from the variable unitsf, 
which records the estimate of finished living space given by the respondent, (or if one is 
not given, the interviewer is asked to make an estimate). If an estimate is not available, 
the square footage is imputed subsequently based upon comparable homes (these ‘hot-
decked’ observations are not included in our analysis, see below). Nevertheless, there is 
wide variation in the housing size estimates recorded in unitsf, even accounting for self-
reported renovations and home additions which influence the size of the home. For this 
reason, additional steps were taken to normalize the value of housing square footage. 
 
In particular, the square footage of the home was compared to a variable denoting 
whether renovations or improvements to the home had resulted in a change of square 




estimate of square footage was blank, we re-entered the previous value for square 
footage. This was conducted year-by-year throughout the sample, resulting in 2327 
additional square footage observations (7518 remain missing).  
 
Note on unit type 
Several classes of units exist within the AHS data: mobile homes, apartments or 
condos in multi-dwelling buildings, attached homes, and detached or semi-detached 
homes. Our study focuses on single-family detached or semi-detached dwellings. For this 
reason, the ‘TYPE” variable is used to select out some of the other categories. In 
particular, the question asks: ‘Are your living quarters in a…?’ and we select values only 
corresponding to answer 1, which is “house, apartment, or flat”. This step excludes 
mobile homes, hotels and temporary dwellings. We also select using the variable 
“NUNIT” which asks “these living quarters in a” and we keep observations with answers 
reflecting either: “one-unit building, detached from any other building”, or “one unit 
building, attached to one or more buildings”. This selection explicitly excludes the 
remaining answers (3: “building with two or more apartments”, and 4: “manufactured 
(mobile) home”). Finally, we select on the variable “NUNITS” which is the number of 
units in the building. For reasons spelled above, we select only observations with a value 








Note on dropping observations 
1. To prepare the sample for estimation, any ‘hot-decked’ observations for the 
variables used in the regressions were discarded. ‘Hot decking’ consists of imputing 
missing observation values based upon comparable individuals.  
2. Observations that self-described as a timeshare, or unsuitable for year-round 
habitation, were dropped. 
3. Observations that experienced a change in the amount of energy or gas used 
varied by more than 500% in any successive period, when there was no reported 
renovation in the home and the square footage had not changed.  
4. Homes that experienced a 10-fold change in square footage in any successive 
period, or with a change in square footage of more than 100% without a reported 
renovation to the home, were discarded.  
5. Homes with a reported square footage in excess of 10,000 sq. ft. or less than 400 
sq. ft. (roughly the bottom and top 5% of the distribution) were dropped. 
 











Table AB.1 Any heater investments on different samples 
Dependent any heat investment (heater or water heater) 
Periods 97-01 7-Mar 97-99 7-May 2 periods 6 periods All 
  (A) (B) (C)  (D) (E) (F) (G) 
movenext -0.152 -0.275* -0.242* -0.654** -0.229 -0.564 -0.167 
lamte_r -0.00142 0.0128 -0.00523 0.0144 0.00633 0.0153 0.00271 
lamtg_r 0.0149** 0.000894 0.0142* -0.00442 0.0119 -0.00287 0.0109* 
lzinc2_r 0.00259 0.00291 0.00234 -0.00047 -0.000856 -0.000086 0.00265 
dep_child 0.0046 0.00473 -0.00149 0.00433 0.00899 -0.0136 0.00422 
zadult -0.00182 -0.0119 -0.00142 -0.0236* 0.00327 -0.0114 -0.00384 
elderly -0.0168 -0.00552 -0.0270* 0.00518 -0.03 -0.0131 -0.0102 
youngest 0.00019 0.0000383 0.0000625 -0.000376 0.000705* 0.00000568 0.000116 
nworkers 0.00609 0.00574 0.00361 0.00609 0.0124 0.00445 0.00609 
collegegrad 0.0217 0.0272 0.0272 0.0295 0.0382 0.0239 0.0235** 
postgrad 0.0227 0.0318* 0.0176 0.0289 0.0216 0.0159 0.0265** 
lhdd 0.0132* 0.0154 0.0102 0.0363** 0.00617 0.00999 0.0102* 
labor_wage_r -0.00313* -0.00477** -0.00245 -0.00760** -0.00767** -0.00271 -0.00421*** 
hpi -0.000141 -0.00016 -0.000000777 -0.000098 -0.0000526 -0.000164 -0.000158* 
lsqft 0.00233 -0.0025 0.00299 -0.00353 0.00438 0.00374 0.000654 
hage20plus 0.0868*** 0.100*** 0.0775*** 0.0923*** 0.101*** 0.126*** 0.0961*** 
rooms 0.00485* 0.0042 0.00612* 0.00259 0.00456 0.00885* 0.00465** 
floors -0.00924* -0.00654 -0.00863 -0.0149 0.00129 -0.00802 -0.00657* 
allP       0.00368 
T_willid       -0.00126 
Constant -0.129 -0.0797 -0.0995 -0.121 -0.177 -0.185 -0.0852 
R-squared 0.0345 0.015 0.022 . 0.0631 0.00695 0.0376 
N. of cases 12698 9978 8804 6299 4662 3371 23645 






Table AB.2 Additional investment classes 
Dependent A/C  Driveway Recreate Door Roof Plumbing 
Model IV 2SLS     
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Move Out -0.0831 -0.00202 -0.0272 -0.00538 -0.128 -0.00136 
Log Electric 
Bill 
0.0123*** 0.00258 0.00354* -0.0132** -0.00692 0.000853 
Log Gas Bill -0.00236 -0.00648* -0.00167 0.00627 -0.000381 0.00249 
Log Income 0.00167 0.00280** 0.000631 0.00139 -0.00234 0.00154 
No. Children -0.000846 -0.0014 0.00275** 0.00622* -0.0023 0.00606* 
No. Adults -0.00291 0.000141 -0.00158 -0.000643 0.003 0.00162 
Elderly -0.00233 -0.00698 -0.00322 -0.0149* 0.00411 -0.0132* 
Youngest 
Age 
-0.00000166 -0.0000984 -0.0000950* -0.000465** -0.0000708 -0.000337* 
No. Workers 0.00286 0.0011 -0.000278 0.0106*** 0.00341 0.00236 
College Grad 0.0103 0.0142* 0.00105 0.00163 -0.00135 0.0231** 
Post College 0.0126 0.0133* 0.00274 0.0116 0.00277 0.0217* 
Log HDD -0.00691* 0.0124*** -0.00127 0.0146** -0.00114 -0.00444 
Log Sq. Ft 0.00101 0.00366*** 0.000971** -0.00145 -0.00202 0.00149 
Wage Rate -0.00548*** 0.00109 -0.000807* -0.00269* -0.00231* -0.00174 
HPI -0.000142** 0.0000439 0.0000347 -0.0000126 -0.000195** -0.0000656 
Home Age 
20+ 
0.0364*** 0.0270*** -0.0015 0.0956*** 0.0783*** 0.0781*** 
No. Rooms 0.00182 0.00193* 0.00148** 0.00134 -0.00101 0.00406** 
No. Floors 0.000737 0.000569 -0.00265** -0.00463 0.00527 -0.00631* 
Constant 0.0676 -0.157*** 0.0197 0.00883 0.176** 0.00905 
R-squared 0.0301 0.00685 0.0078 0.0202 0.0476 0.0145 
N. of cases 23645 23645 23645 23645 23645 23645 





Appendix C: Supplementary Materials for Chapter 5  
C.1 Notes for Maryland Survey Data 
 
Selecting Building Permits 
Building permits are public record, and were obtained from the county permit 
offices St. Marys, Charles, and Calvert counties. After compiling the records, all 
commercial property applications were removed, along with permits that indicated new 




The dwelling age, number of floors, square footage, lot acreage, and classification 
and condition are gathered from a property database that includes structural 
characteristics of the home and is maintained by the Maryland Department of Planning 
for tax assessment and policy purposes. The database provides property map, parcel 
information, address, detailed housing unit characteristics (with residential 
improvements), and any recent sales or transfers within the past year.61  
 
Recent Mover Data 
                                                 






Data on the names and addresses of recent movers was obtained from a data 
services company, Acxiom. The data are gathered from mail forwarding forms processed 
by the US Postal Service.62 
 
C.2 Text of Survey Mailings 
 
Text of the survey recruitment letter 
Below is the text of the first wave survey recruitment letter. The enticement 
language in the second wave recruitment letter was changed to reflect the new prize 
distribution, but was otherwise the same. The letter was printed on University letterhead 
and signed by professors Alberini and Towe. The user ID and password were randomly 
assigned to each individual for use as login credentials for the survey website. 
  
                                                 







Dear Maryland Resident, 
 
The University of Maryland is conducting an on-line survey to study neighborhoods, homes, and 
energy usage in Maryland. We are requesting your participation in this survey because you 
represent your household and other Maryland households similar to yours. 
 
The information that you provide through the survey questionnaire is important, and will help 
guide state and federal policy decisions. In addition, by filling out the questionnaire you will help 
University of Maryland graduate students with their dissertation research and undergraduate 
students with hands-on training in data analysis.  
 
Please be assured that your answers to the survey questions are completely confidential. The 
survey is being conducted for research purposes, and we will not disclose your identity to anyone, 
nor link your responses to your name. Participation is voluntary and you can stop at any time.  
  
Being a survey respondent is easy and takes only twenty minutes. As a token of our appreciation 
for completing the questionnaire, you will be entered in a raffle to win a prepaid card worth $100, 
which you can use at the store of your choice, or on-line. We are giving away a total of sixteen 
(16) $100 cards. If you wish to participate in the survey but not in the raffle, you will be given the 
option to decline the raffle at the end of the questionnaire.  
 
You are eligible to participate in the survey if:  
 You are the person listed on this letter, or live at the address printed above, and  
 You have access to the internet for 20-30 minutes to take the survey. 
 
 
How to take the survey:  
Please go the following website: http://www.energyumd.org  
Enter your user ID: XXXXX     
and your password: YYYYY 
 
Other information about the survey, including details on data privacy procedures, and information 
on the raffle drawing are at http://energy.arec.umd.edu  Questions?  Please call Will Gans at 301 
592-7780 or send an e-mail to energy@arec.umd.edu.  
 
 








Text of the survey recruitment follow-up letter 
Below is the text of the first wave survey recruitment follow-up letter. Again, the 
second wave enticement language differed, but the letter was otherwise the same, and the 







Dear Maryland Resident, 
 
A few weeks ago you received an invitation from the University of Maryland to participate in an 
on-line survey to study neighborhoods, homes, and energy usage in Maryland. We are requesting 
your participation in this survey because you represent your household and other Maryland 
households similar to yours. 
 
If you have already completed the questionnaire, we would like to thank you. At this time, there 
is no need for you to do anything else. We will contact you within a month’s time if you are one 
of the 16 raffle winners. 
 
If you have not filled out the questionnaire yet, we would like to ask you to do so at your earliest 
convenience. 
 
Being a survey respondent is easy and takes only twenty minutes. As a token of our appreciation 
for completing the questionnaire, you will be entered in a raffle to win a prepaid card worth $100, 
which you can use at the store of your choice, or on-line. We are giving away a total of sixteen 
(16) $100 cards. If you wish to participate in the survey but not in the raffle, you will be given the 
option to decline the raffle at the end of the questionnaire.  
 
You are eligible to participate in the survey if:  
 You are the person listed on this letter, or live at the address printed above, and  
 You have access to the internet for 20-30 minutes to take the survey. 
 
 
How to take the survey:  
Please go the following website: http://www.energyumd.org  
Enter your user ID: XXXXX     
and your password: YYYYY 
 
Other information about the survey, including details on data privacy procedures, and information 
on the raffle drawing are at http://energy.arec.umd.edu  Questions?  Please call Will Gans at 301 
592-7780 or send an e-mail to energy@arec.umd.edu.  
 
 







C.3 Information on Support Website 
As discussed in Chapter 5, a survey support website (energy.arec.umd.edu) was 
established. Below are several screenshots displaying the information that was included 
on the website. The home page is displayed in Figure 3, The Privacy page in Figure 4, 
and the Research Goals page in Figure 5. 
 






Figure 4: Screen Shot of Privacy Page 
 
 







C.4 Additional Figures from Questionnaire 
 
 
Figure 6: Attribute Ratings after Choice Experiment 1 
 





C.5 Additional Robustness Checks from Discount Rate Analysis 
 
Table AC.2 Interactions with energy efficiency attitudes 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
Beta1 -0.00154*** -0.00154*** -0.00153*** -0.00154*** -0.00153*** 
0.000115 0.000115 0.000115 0.00012 0.000117 
Beta2 0.00154*** 0.00154*** 0.00153*** 0.00154*** 0.00153*** 
0.000167 0.000173 0.000171 0.000251 0.000208 
Delta (energy) 0.0219 0.0233 0.0228 0.0301 0.0211 
0.0142 0.015 0.0147 0.0286 0.0205 
EE Invest (no)  0.0466 
0.0674 
EE Save (no)  -0.0303 
0.0368 
EE Resale (no)  -0.0171 
0.0452 
EE Invest (yes)  -0.0143 
0.0139 
EE Save (yes) 0.00425 
0.0133 
Log-likelihood -1205.221 -1205.29 -1205.507 -1204.928 -1205.521 
LR test 392.645 392.508 392.073 393.232 392.045 
N Obs 2022 2022 2022 2022 2022 
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